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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses how the Commerce Act 1986 can be used to challenge predatory conduct. 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Limited demonstrates 
that both section 27 and section 36 can be used.for this purpose. This represents a significant 
extension to the scope of section 27. Whether this extension can be justified by the policy 
underlying section 2 7 is considered. The paper also considers recent judicial interpretations of 
the "use" element of section 36. These inte,pretalions have severely limited the effectiveness 
of section 36. The need for legislative amendment lo correct these difficulties is also 
addressed. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Commerce Act 1986 ("the Act") is intended to promote competition in New Zealand 
markets . This purpose is primarily achieved by section 27 and section 3 6 of the Act. Each 
section prohibits different types of conduct that reduce competition. Section 27 targets 
collusive agreements between two or more firms which substantially lessen competition in 
a market. The focus of the section is therefore on bilateral conduct. Section 36 focuses 
on a firm which uses its dominant position in a market for one of the proscribed 
anticompetitive purposes. Section 36 is therefore focused toward preventing unilateral 
anticompetitive action by a firm with a significant degree of market power. 
The Act seeks to encourage legitimate competition between competitors m the same 
market. This competitive process often allows firms to exploit advantages that they have 
because of their position in that market. The Act prohibits a firm illegitimately eliminating 
its competitors or potential competitors from a market or otherwise reducing the level of 
competitive activity in a market. Predatory conduct of this nature can take a number of 
different forms, and can occur both inside and outside the market. 
1 A firm with predatory 
intent attempts to unilaterally exploit its market power to eliminate its competitors and 
potential competitors. For this reason, predatory conduct has traditionally been challenged 
using section 36 of the Act. 
The decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Commerce Commission v Port 
Nelson Limitecf clearly demonstrate that at least some forms of predatory conduct can be 
challenged using section 27. This paper examines these decisions and considers why each 
Court used section 27 to challenge Port Nelson ' s actions. The scope of section 27 has 
been significantly widened by the reasoning relied upon in Port Nelson. Section 27 can 
now be used to challenge unilateral anticompetitive conduct. The significance of this 
approach can be analysed on a number of levels. 
Y van Roy 'The Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear: Narrowing the application of s 36 of 
the Commerce Act 1986" [19951 NZLJ 54, 58. 
[ 1996] 3 NZLR 554. Gault J delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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The types of conduct that were held to breach section 27 in Port Nelson were below cost 
pricing and the offering of discounts which were conditional on the purchase of a range of 
bundled services. Given the wide interpretation accorded section 27 in Port Nelson , it is 
likely that other forms of predatory conduct will also be held to breach section 27. 
Whether this in fact occurs will depend upon whether subsequent courts follow the 
reasoning developed in Port Nelson. An analysis of the Courts' reasoning is therefore 
important to determine the kind of conduct that firms can undertake without contravening 
section 27 of the Act. 
Perhaps of more significance is the effect of the decision in Port Nelson on the scheme of 
the Act as a whole. The interpretation of section 27 can be contrasted with the way the 
courts have interpreted section 36 of the Act. Recent cases, including Port Nelson, have 
read the "use" element of section 36 very narrowly.
3 These interpretations have 
significantly decreased the range of unilateral conduct that can be challenged using section 
36. This has resulted in the Courts using section 27 to challenge conduct that was 
intended by the framers of the Act to be challenged under section 36. 
This paper considers how predatory conduct can be challenged using the Act. Does the 
use of section 27 for this purpose in Port Nelson mean that the courts are not having due 
regard to the scheme and conceptual basis underlying the Act? Or does it not matter 
which section of the Act is used for this purpose provided that this kind of anticompetitive 
conduct is prevented from occurring? The following structure is used to address these 
issues. 
Part II outlines the scheme and purpose of the Act. The prohibitions contained in both 
section 27 and section 36 are outlined, and the interpretation of each section by the courts 
prior to Port Nelson is summarised. The types of conduct that each section typically seeks 
to prevent are also considered. Part III analyses how the predatory conduct that occurred 
in Port Nelson was challenged by the Commerce Commission under section 27 and 
considers how similar conduct is challenged in overseas jurisdictions. Part IV considers 
These cases are analysed in Part V. 
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the legal interpretations of section 27 that were adopted by the High Court and the Court 
of Appeal in Port Nelson. The width of these interpretations are analysed. 
Part V considers how section 36 can be used to challenge predatory conduct. Recent 
court decisions that have narrowed the scope of section 36 are considered and critically 
analysed. The paper concludes by assessing whether the effectiveness of the Act in 
challenging predatory conduct has been diminished by these recent decisions. Whether 
legislative reform is required to remedy any defects in the Act that have emerged is also 
considered. 
II THE SCHEME OF THE ACT 
A The Purpose of the Commerce Act 
The long title of the Act provides that the purpose of the Act is "to promote competition 
in markets within New Zealand ." Patterson unequivocally argues that the concept of 
competition is central to the operation of the Act. He states that:
4 
It is clear that competition is the fundamental concept on which the Act is based, 
and that the promotion of competition is the single objective of the Act. 
This view reflects the thinking of the original framers of the Act. A paper released by the 
Department of Trade and Industry outlining the scope of the Act acknowledged that the 
promotion of competition was the primary policy objective. 
5 A vigorous debate centreing 
on whether the promotion of competition remains the primary focus on the Act has 
4 RH Patterson "How the Chicago School Hijacked New Zealand Competition Law and Policy" 
(1996) 17 NZULR 160, 167. Patterson supports this view by reference to the Department of 
Trade and Industry ' s Background Paper to the Commerce Bill (1985). This Commentary states 
that "f t]he policy implicit in the adoption of the objective of promoting competition is that 
competition will give rise to durable economic and social outcomes. For example assisting in the 
achievement of economic efficiency or consumer protection objectives. " 
Department of Trade and Industry Commerce Bill 1985 A Background to the Bill and an 
Outline of its Provisions (Wellington, 1985) 3. 
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ensued. 6 The increasing acceptance by the courts of efficiency-based justifications for 
conduct undertaken in New Zealand markets reflects the increasing influence of "Chicago 
School" theory on New Zealand's competition law and practice.
7 
The leading statement by the Court of Appeal on the role of the Act emphasises the 
importance of rivalrous conduct between competitors. The Court of Appeal in Tru Tone 
Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd stated that :
8 
[the Act] is based on the premise that society ' s resources are best allocated in a 
competitive market where rivalry between firms ensures maximum efficiency in 
the use of resources. 
The Act has become an important tool in regulating the competitive conduct of firms that 
are operating in industries that have recently been deregulated.
9 Judicial interpretations of 
the prohibitions contained in the Act must be seen against this background. The principal 
prohibitions are analysed below. 
B Substantial Lessening of Competition 
Section 27 prevents firms from entering a contract, arrangement or understanding which 
substantially lessens competition in a market. Section 27(1) provides: 
6 
8 
9 
27. Contracts, arrangements, or understandings substantially lessening 
competition prohibited-( I) No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, 
The competing views are conveniently summarised in Patterson, above n 4, 166-172. 
See Fisher & Paykel v Co111merce Co111mission 119901 2 NZLR 731 , and the criticism of the 
reliance on Chicago School Theory in R Ahdar "Exclusive Dealing and the Fisher & Paykel 
Saga" (1992) 15 NZULR 1. 
[ 1988] 2 NZLR 352, 358. This statement was cited with approval in Fisher & Paykel v 
Com111erce Commission. above n 7, 756. 
J Farmer "Transition from Protected Monopoly to Competition: The New Zealand Experiment" 
(1993-94) l CCLJ 1 contains an interesting analysis of the Act ' s importance in recently 
deregulated industries. 
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or arrive at an understanding, containing a provision that has the purpose, or has 
or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market. 
Section 27 only applies to contracts, arrangements or understandings. Anticompetitive 
conduct will often arise out of a contract. Whether a contract exists is determined by the 
ordinary common law rules and the term does not have a specialised meaning in the Act. 
10 
Arrangements and understandings encompass dealings between parties that do not give 
rise to a binding contract. These concepts require a meeting of minds between two or 
more people that leads to an agreed course of action. 
11 
Section 27 does not seek to identify and prohibit specific anticompetitive practices. 
Section 27 only prohibits contracts, arrangements or understandings which have the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of "substantially lessening competition in a market". The 
types of conduct that may substantially lessen competition are potentially very broad . 
Whether a particular type of conduct contravenes section 27 depends upon the nature of 
the conduct and whether it interferes with the competitive processes that occur within a 
market. Determining whether competition has been substantially lessened therefore 
requires the nature of the competition in the market to be considered. 
Competition is defined in section 3(1) of the Act to mean "workable or effective 
competition". The extent of competition in a market is analysed against the principles 
stated in Re Queensland Co-op Milling Association Ltd & Defiance Holdings Ltd 
(QCMA). 12 QCMA recognised that "[c]ompetition is a process rather than a situation"
13 
and cannot therefore be analysed at any one moment in time. The structure of the market 
and the nature of the competitive behaviour engaged in by market participants determine 
10 
II 
12 
13 
See I !ughes v Western Australian Cricket Association ( 1986) ATPR 40-736. 
British Basic Slag v Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements [1963] 2 All ER 807; TPC v 
Nicholas Enterprises P(v Ltd ( 1979) ATPR 40-126: Apple Fields Ltd v New Zealand Apple and 
Pear Marketing Board 11991] I NZLR 257 (PC). 
(1976) ATPR 40-012 . QCA!A has been consistently applied by New Zealand courts. See. for 
example, Fisher & Paykel v Co111111erce Co111111ission, above n 7: Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records 
Retail !v/arketing Ltd. above n 8: Commerce Commission v Port Ne lson , above n 2. 
Above n 12, 17,246. 
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the level of competition that occurs in a market. 
14 The relevant inquiry focuses on 
competition in the market as a whole rather than the effect of an action on any individual 
· 15 competitor. 
Assessing whether competition is substantially lessened requires the court to compare the 
level of competitive activity before and after the allegedly anticompetitive agreement took 
effect. This principle was stated in Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine 
Pty Ltd: 16 
To apply the concept of substantially lessening competition in a market, it is necessary to 
assess the nature and extent of the market, the probable nature and e:x.1:ent of competition 
which would exist therein but for the conduct in question, the way the market operates and 
the nature and extent of the contemplated lessening. To my mind one must look at the 
relevant significant proportion of the market, ask oneself how and to what extent there 
would have been competition therein but for the conduct, assess what is left and determine 
whether what has been lost in relation to what have been, is seen to be a substantial 
lessening of competition. 
The effect of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct upon competition in a market therefore 
determines whether section 27 applies. 
C The Use of a Dominant Position 
Section 36 prevents firms that are in a dominant position m a market from using that 
position for one of the proscribed anticompetitive purposes.
17 Section 36(1) reads: 
14 
15 
16 
17 
See QC/v!A , above n 12, 17,246 and Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd, above
 
n 8,363. 
See the cases analysed in Part IV.C 
(1982) ATPR 40-315, 43 ,887-43 ,888. Several New Zealand cases have adopted this test. For
 
example A uckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (A uckland Jlirport) Ltd P987) 2
 
NZLR 647 and Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd, above n 8. 
The proscribed purposes are contained in section 36(l)'s three limbs, (a), (b) and (c). 
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36. Use of dominant position in a market-( I) No person who has a dominant 
position in a market shall use that position for the purpose of-
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive 
conduct in that or any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
Section 36 does not prohibit the "creation and continued existence" of dominant fi
rms in 
New Zealand markets.
18 Similarly, the Privy Council has observed that section 36 does 
not prevent dominant firms competing against other firms : 
19 
A monopolist is entitled, like everyone else, to compete with its competitors: if it is 
not permitted to do so it "would be holding an umbrella over inefficient 
competitors"... . 
Rather the section targets dominant firms which use their position for one 
of the 
proscribed anticompetitive purposes. The misuse by firms of their dominant positio
n is the 
type of conduct targeted by section 36. The focus is on these firms unilaterally exe
rcising 
their market power to the detriment of other competitors, or potential competitors
, in the 
market. 
Section 36 has three mam constituent parts, each of which must be satisfied b
efore a 
breach of the section can be established.2° A firm must be in a dominant positi
on in a 
market; the firm must use that position; and the use must be for one of the pu
rposes 
proscribed by the section. While a detailed analysis of each element is outside the sc
ope of 
18 
19 
20 
See L Hampton "Section 36( I) of the Commerce Act 1986: An Analysis of its
 Constituent 
Elements" in RJ Ahdar (ed) Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand (The La
w Book Co 
Ltd, Sydney, 1991) 179. 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications Limited [1995
) I NZLR 
385. 402 (PC). 
A recent comprehensive analysis of the constituent parts of section 36 is contained 
in FJ Heiford 
Rethinking Unilateral Conduct: A Holistic Approach to Section 36 of the Commerc
e Act 1986 
(LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1996). 
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this paper, it is necessary to briefly consider each element to fully understand the 
significance of the decision in Port Nelson. These elements are discussed below. 
Section 36 only applies to firms that have market dominance. The Court of Appeal in 
Telecom C01poration of New Zealand v Commerce Commission ( "AMPS A ''.)2
1 held that 
"dominance" bears its ordinary meaning and that the factors listed in section 3(8) of the 
Act should be considered when assessing whether a firm is dominant. AMPS A has been 
criticised for raising the threshold of market power required to a level that was never 
intended. 22 Gault J expressly rejected this criticism in Port Nelson. The level of market 
power required for section 36 is that anticipated by Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, on 
which the New Zealand concept of dominance is modelled.
23 Determining whether this 
threshold is passed, so that section 36 applies, requires a broad factual assessment of the 
· 24 clfcumstances. 
A firm must "use" its dominance for a proscribed "purpose" before section 36 is 
contravened. The meaning of "use" was considered by the Privy Council in Telecom 
Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications Limited.
25 A firm does not 
use its market dominance if it acts in a way that a non-dominant firm in a contestable 
market would act. This test has been severely criticised for being too restrictive and 
therefore limiting the effectiveness of section 36. The Privy Council appears also to have 
downplayed the importance of proving that the alleged anticompetitive conduct has the 
necessary proscribed purpose. These elements of section 36 are considered in greater 
detail in Part V. 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
f 1992] 3 NZLR 429. 
See RH Patterson "The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in New Zealand Competition Law: 
From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation" (1993) 15 NZULR 265. 
Above n 2, 574. McGechan J's judgment in Port Ne lson is also premised on this basis. 
McGechan J's approach to the question of market dominance was expressly approved in Power 
New Zealand Ltd v Alercury Energy Ltd f J 996] l NZLR 686. 710. 
Above n 2, 573 . Sec Re Continental Can Co Inc [19721 CMLR Dl I and Hoffman-la Roche & 
Co v EC Commission I 19791 3 CMLR 211 for the relevant considerations. 
Above n 19. The exact wording of the Privy Council's test is quoted in Part V. 
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D The Traditional Application of Section 27 and Section 36 to Predatory Conduct 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that although both section 27 and section 36 are 
intended to promote competition, the scope of each section is different. Predatory conduct 
has traditionally been challenged under section 36 of the Act. This is because predatory 
conduct is often undertaken by a firm that acts unilatera11y to reduce competition in a 
market. A firm ' s ability to act in this way stems from its significant level of market power 
rather than collusive agreements with other firms . 
26 The nature of predatory conduct 
therefore means that the elements required to breach section 36 will often be present 
where firms act in this way. Section 36 has been used by New Zealand courts to challenge 
a variety of predatory conduct. 
27 
Section 27 prohibits collusive agreements between firms which have the purpose, effect or 
likely effect of substantially lessening competition. The section applies to horizontal 
agreements between competitors designed to exclude another competitor from a market.
28 
It equally applies to vertical agreements between parties at different functional levels in a 
market that restrict competition.
29 The premise underlying section 27 is that collusion 
exists between the parties to the agreement.
30 This premise can be inferred from the use of 
the words "contract, arrangement or understanding". These words require a "meeting of 
minds" between the relevant parties.
31 In New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson 
Bloodstock Ltd, Tipping J commented that:
32 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
See J Eisenberg "Predatory Pricing in the Context of Australian and New Zealand Competition 
Law" in Commerce Commission Current issues in New Zealand Competition and Consumer Law 
(Wellington, volume 4, 1991) for the arguments supporting this view. 
Examples of the predatory conduct that breaches section 36 are considered in Y van Roy 
Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws (2 ed. CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, 1991) 
159-161 and Gault on Commercial Law (Brooker' s Ltd, Wellington, 1994) CA 36.32 
For example, Re Chemists ' Guild of New Zealand (Inc) (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,058. 
For example, Fisher & Pay/.:el, above n 7. 
The authors of GQ Taparell , RB Vermeesch and DJ Harland Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection (3 ed, Butterworths, Sydney. 1983) at paragraph 523 clearly anticipate that collusion is 
necessary for a contract, arrangement or understanding to exist. A similar conclusion is reached 
in I Bruce. G Donald, JD Heydon Trade Practices law: Restrictive Trade Practices, Deceptive 
Conduct and Consumer Protection (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney. 1989) 131. 
Above n 11. 
[1990J 1 NZLR 731 , 764-765 . 
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Section 27 is aimed at contracts or understandings between parties having the 
collusive effect of reducing competition . To bring s 27 into play there must I 
would have thought be some meeting of minds between the parties to the alleged 
contract or arrangement or understanding. 
Magic M;//ions demonstrates that section 27 has traditionally only applied where collusion 
exists between the parties to an allegedly anticompetitive agreement. This view also has 
academic support. The authors of Gault on Commercial Law take the view that a person 
acting alone, without colluding with another person, cannot contravene section 27.
33 
Section 27 was not intended to prohibit one firm from engaging in a course of conduct 
intended to eliminate its competitors. 
34 
The previously well accepted distinction between the types of conduct respectively 
targeted by section 27 and section 36 has been fundamentally changed by Port Nelson . 
This decision demonstrates that section 27 can now be used to challenge the conduct of a 
firm that acts unilaterally with the intention of eliminating a competitor from a market. 
This is particularly significant in two respects. The scope of section 27 has been widened. 
A greater variety of anticompetitive conduct is now susceptible to challenge using the 
section. Secondly, the decision changes the underlying scheme of the Act. Section 27, as 
well as section 36, can now potentially be used to challenge predatory conduct. Whether it 
is appropriate to dilute the conceptual distinction between unilateral and collusive conduct, 
as was effectively done in Port Nelson, is a question that is considered later in this paper. 
35 
The decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal in Port Nelson are analysed in Part 
III. 
33 
34 
35 
Above n 27, CA 27.07. 
This point is made in Gault on Commercial Law. above n 27, CA 36.11. 
See Part VI. The conceptual distinction between unilateral and collusive conduct was considered 
by I Eagles "Of Ports, Pilots and Predation: New Zealand Courts Reassess some Competition 
Fundamentals" fl 996J 8 ECLR 462. 
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III PORT NELSON AND PREDA TORY CONDUCT 
A The Nature of the Conduct in Port Nelson 
The decision of the Court of Appeal is the third time that the conduct of Port Nelson 
Limited ("PNL") has been considered by the courts in relation to alleged breaches of the 
Act. 36 This presumably reflects PNL' s response to the increased competitive threat that it 
faced in certain aspects of its operations since the deregulation of port activity throughout 
New Zealand. 
PNL provided port facilities at Nelson. PNL also supplied related services, the most 
important of which were tug services and pilot services. All vessels entering Port Nelson 
had to be piloted. PNL initially supplied pilot services to vessels using pilots contracted 
from Tasman Bay Maritime Pilots Ltd ("TBMPL"). Difficulties in renegotiating these 
contracts lead to the termination of this relationship. At this point, TBMPL decided to 
provide independent pilotage services direct to vessels entering Port Nelson. PNL 
employed one pilot to perform the pilotage services that it offered . The provision of 
pilotage services was therefore competitive. 
PNL was concerned by this competitive threat. PNL responded with three measures. It 
refused to allow TBMPL to use the tugs that it owned unless any pilotage services 
required were provided by PNL employees. This was described as a "tug tie". The 
possibility of competition had caused PNL to separate its charges for pilotage services 
from its other charges. PNL' s pilotage charges were based on the vessel ' s gross registered 
tonnage ("GRT"), with the minimum charge being $100 for vessels up to 2500 GRT. 
Finally, PNL offered a five percent discount on all its charges to vessels that used PNL for 
tug, pilotage and ships lines services and that also used PNL' s subsidiary company for any 
stevedoring that was required . The minimum pilotage charge and five percent discount 
were provided for in a contract entered into between PNL and the consumers of services 
36 The other two occasions where Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 662 and 
Stevedoring Services (Ne lson) Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd [ 1992] NZAR 5. 
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provided by PNL at Port Nelson. These contracts, which were challenged under section 
27, were therefore vertical supply contracts. 
The Commerce Commission investigated the measures undertaken by PNL. In due course 
it commenced a proceeding against PNL alleging breaches of section 27 and section 36 of 
the Act. The case came before McGechan J and Professor Lattimore in the High Court .
37 
The High Court held that the five percent discount and the $100 minimum charge breached 
section 27 and that the tug tie breached section 36. These decisions were upheld by the 
Court of Appeal. 
B Market Definition 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that defining the relevant market was difficult where 
"virtually the whole area of relevant commercial activity is in transition from statutory 
monopoly and has only recently been opened to competitive conduct."
38 
PNL argued that the provision of tug services and pilotage services to shippers that used 
the port should be viewed as integrated services and were therefore part of a single vessel 
movements market. The Commerce Commission argued that tug services and pilotage 
services were often supplied separately, both in Nelson and overseas, and therefore 
comprised separate markets. The High Court preferred the market definitions pleaded by 
the Commerce Commission. McGechan J stated:
39 
37 
38 
39 
Vessels coming from abroad will be familiar with provision of pilotage and towage 
separately. It is not outside contemplation rthatl pilotage could be taken from one 
source, and towage from another. With a price differential, such indeed would be 
likely. 
Professor Lattimore was the lay assessor who sat as a member of the Court pursuant to section 78 
of the Act. 
Above n 2, 560. 
Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd ( 1995) 6 TCLR 406, 520 (HC). 
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The Court of Appeal was clearly aware of the significance of this finding for the ultimate 
outcome of the case when it commented that acceptance of separate tug services and 
pilotage services markets was of "considerable significance" in assessing PNL' s conduct 
against sections 27 and 36. The Court of Appeal however concurred with the High 
Court ' s assessment of the relevant markets. 
C Predatory Pricing 
The Act does not define or specifically prohibit predatory pricing.
40 While predatory 
pricing is a difficult concept to define, it generally describes the situation where a firm 
reduces the price of goods and services below cost for the purpose of reducing or 
eliminating competition within a market.
4 1 However, this generic description of predatory 
pricing is imprecise because firms will often reduce the price of goods and services to very 
low levels for legitimate commercial reasons . The difficulty that the courts face is 
determining whether, in light of the surrounding circumstances, a firm can properly be seen 
as engaging in predatory pricing or is simply engaging in vigorous competitive activity. 
This distinction is often difficult to draw. 
Whether "predatory pricing" can be challenged under either section 27 or section 36 
therefore depends on the nature of the conduct that is proscribed by each section. The 
statutory requirements, rather than generic definitions of predatory pricing, determine 
whether "predatory" price reductions are prohibited in New Zealand . The application of 
each section to the circumstances of each case must therefore be the central inquiry. This 
Part considers how section 27 and section 36 can be used to challenge predatory pricing 
and whether one section should be preferred to the other in any given set of circumstances. 
40 
41 
Y van Roy "Predatory Pricing and Sections 36 and 36A of the Commerce Act 1986" presented at 
the First Annual Workshop of the Competition Law and Policy Institute of New Zealand Inc 
(Christchurch, 1990) 3. 
V Nagarajan "The Regulation of Predatory Pricing within s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974" 
(1990) 18 ABLR 293 , 294 and K McMahon "Predatory Pricing under Section 46 of the Trade 
Practices Act and the decision in Eastern Express v General Newspapers- Part I" (1993) 1 TPLJ 
75, 76. The Australian courts have generally declined to attempt exhaustive definitions of what 
constitutes "predatory pricing" . 
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1 The traditional approach lo challenging predatory pricing 
Section 36 has traditionally been the most likely avenue to use when challenging predatory 
pncmg. This view has substantial academic support, 
42 even though predatory pricing has 
not yet been successfully challenged under section 36. The probable reason for this 
prevailing view is that the Australian courts had analysed allegations of predatory pricing 
under the Australian equivalent to section 36 in the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 
(the "ATPA"). The combination of market power and behaviour required to successfully 
engage in predatory pricing seems to indicate that section 36 is "directed" toward 
prohibiting conduct of this kind. Predation, by its nature, requires a high degree of market 
power. The more market power a firm has, the more likely it is that that firm will be able 
to successfully engage in predatory pricing. A participant in a highly competitive market is 
unlikely to have the ability to successfully eliminate a competitor by pricing below cost. 
A number of cases demonstrate that how Australian courts interpret and apply section 46 
of the ATPA is relevant to how section 36 is likely to be used to challenge predatory 
pricing in New Zealand.
43 Both sections are directed at preventing broadly similar kinds of 
exclusionary conduct. 
44 Even though judicial interpretations of each section may create 
differences in the respective scope of the sections, considerable guidance can be obtained 
from the Australian case law. 
42 
43 
44 
See Y van Roy, above n 40; Y van Roy Guidebook lo New Zealand Competition laws, above n 
27, 760; M Berry, T Housden and TM Gault (eds) Gault on Commercial law, above n 27, CA 
36.20; Eisenberg, above n 26: K McMahon "Predatory Pricing under Section 46 of the Trade 
Practices Act and the decision in Eastern Express v General Newspapers- Part II" (] 993) I TPLJ 
130. 
The leading Australian case decided under section 46 of the ATPA is Queensland Wire Industries 
Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd ( 1989) 11 ATPR 40-925 . Queensland /Vire, and the subsequent Australian 
cases which have followed it, have frequently been cited in New Zealand cases which have 
considered section 36. See, for example, Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy [ 19921 
2 NZLR 641 and New Zealand Magic Afillions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd, above n 32. 
Section 46(1) provides: 
"A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take advantage of that 
power for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of a body corporate 
that is related to the corporation in that or any market: 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market: or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other 
market. " 
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Section 46 only applies to firms that have a substantial degree of power in a market. This 
is similar, although not identical, to the dominance requirement of section 36 of the Act. 
The level of market power required before section 36 applies is higher than that required 
for section 46 of the ATPA.
45 Neither section applies where a firm cannot exercise the 
level of market power required by the respective statutes. Firms that are likely to engage 
in predatory pricing generally have a high level of market power in the form of significant 
structural advantages over the other firms in the market.
46 Proving that a firm is 
"dominant" or can exercise a "substantial degree of market power" will not usually be 
difficult where predatory pricing is alleged. It is more difficult to establish that the purpose 
of the dominant firm in substantially reducing its price is anticompetitive. 
Whether a firm undertaking predatory pricing takes advantage of its market power for one 
of the purposes proscribed by section 46 is a question that has been analysed in detail by 
the Australian Courts. Predatory pricing will always involve a reduction in prices that the 
alleged predator charges for goods and services. The crucial distinction involved is 
whether the firm is using price reductions as a means of vigorous competition or whether 
the purpose of the below cost pricing is to eliminate competitors or reduce their ability to 
compete. Whether any particular price reduction contravenes section 46 will depend upon 
the surrounding circumstances and the purpose of the price reduction.
47 
Predatory pncmg was first considered by the Australian courts in The Victorian Egg 
Marketing Board v Parkwood Eggs Pty Ltd 
48 This case concerned a marketing board that 
sold eggs for a price less than the price charged by its competitors by offering discounts 
for prompt payment. The marketing board substantially controlled the relevant wholesale 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy, above n 43. 649-650 analyses the differences in 
the level of market power required by the New Zealand and AustraJian Acts. See also Y van Roy, 
above n 1, 58 . 
See McMahon, above n 41 . 
The point is illustrated by the cases analysed in the text below. 
(1978) A TPR 40-081. 
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egg market. Bowen CJ acknowledged the distinction between legitimate competition and 
predatory pricing in the following terms:
49 
The view has been expressed that the sporadic element, that is to say competition 
which is not intended to be permanent but is for a temporary purpose, is a 
hallmark of a predatory practice and distinguishes it from legitimate competition. 
The Court acknowledged that substantial price reductions could breach section 46 even 
though the price charged was not below cost.
50 Bowen CJ stated:
5 1 
It may be that where one can infer the requisite purpose from other evidence, price 
cutting may be predatory in the sense referred to and a ''taking advantage" of 
power derived from the substantial control of a market, notwithstanding that it is 
not below marginal or average variable cost and does not result in a loss being 
incurred. 
The purpose of the pnce reductions was a determinative factor in The Victorian Egg 
Marketing Board. A similar approach was adopted by the Federal Court in Eastern 
Express Pty Ltd v General Newspapers Pty Ltd. 
52 This case concerned a newspaper 
company that had a near monopoly on local newspaper advertising. The newspaper 
substantially reduced its advertising rates in response to a competitor attempting to enter 
the local newspaper advertising market. The competing newspaper claimed that these 
price reductions contravened section 46. 
The Federal Court, at first instance, recognised that not all pnce reductions constitute 
predatory pricing that may contravene section 46. Wilcox J stated:
53 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Above n 48, 17,789. 
The Trade Practices Commission 's Guidelines also state that whether the price is below cost is 
not necessarily an essential requirement for establishing a breach of section 46. See Trade 
Practices Commission Misuse of Market Power: Background Paper and Guidelines on Section 46 
of the Trade Practices Act 197-1 (Canberra. 1990) 44 . 
Above n 48, 17,789. See also Trade Practices Commission The Failure of Compass A irlines: 
Report by the Trade Practices Commission (February 1992) 25 . 
(1991) ATPR 41-128. 
Above n 52, 52,895 . 
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[T]he outward manifestation of a decision to engage in predatory pncmg 1s a 
lowering of prices, an action which, on its face, is pro-competitive. The factor 
which turns mere price cutting into predatory pricing is the purpose for which it is 
undertaken. That will often be difficult to prove. 
19 
Wilcox J recognised that firms may legitimately reduce their prices to disadvantage or 
harm their competitors. Such behaviour is inherent when a firm engages in vigorous 
competition in a market and does not therefore necessarily breach section 46. Wilcox J 
stated :
54 
Traders commonly fix prices with the intention of diverting to themselves custom 
which would otherwise flow to their competitors. In doing so, they realise that, if 
they are successful, the result will be to damage - in extreme cases, even to 
eliminate - those competitors . But such conduct is the very stuff of competition, 
the result which Part IV seeks to achieve. It would be surprising if Parliament 
intended to proscribe competitive conduct when undertaken by a company with 
sufficient resources to compete effectively. Something more must be required. 
It is therefore necessary to ascertain the purpose of the price reduction . Since a firm is 
unlikely to expressly state that the purpose of the price reduction was to deter or eliminate 
a competitor from the market, this purpose will almost always be inferred from the 
circumstances. Whether this inference will be drawn depends on the nature and extent of 
the price reductions. There must however be "an element of conscious predatory 
behaviour" before section 46 is contravened. 
55 
Wilcox J acknowledged that the "factor which turns mere pnce cutting into predatory 
pricing is the purpose for which it is undertaken". 
56 Price reductions that result in a firm 
incurring a loss allow the court to infer that the firm acted for a proscribed purpose. 
54 
55 
56 
Above n 52, 52,897. 
TPC v CSBP & Farmers (1980) ATPR 40-151, 42,1 62. 
Above n 52, 52,895 . 
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Eastern Express and Victorian Egg indicate that cost-based tests and assessments of l
oss 
will be important in proving the purpose behind a firm ' s pricing decision.
57 Despite this, 
neither decision attempts to identify the appropriate measure of cost. 
What importance do courts in overseas jurisdictions place on a firm ' s ability to re
coup any 
profits temporarily forgone once the targeted competitors have been eliminate
d? The 
United States Supreme Court requires evidence that a firm can recoup losses 
before a 
plaintiff can establish that predatory pricing has occurred. 
58 Hay and McMahon argue that 
assessing the firm's ability to recoup losses has replaced the cost-based tes
ts as an 
indicator of predatory pricing in the United States.
59 Although the issue has never been 
expressly considered by an Australian court, the ability to recoup losses does not a
ppear to 
be necessary to establish that predatory pricing has occurred.
60 The Australian Trade 
Practices Commission has however indicated that the ability to recoup losses may
 indicate 
a predatory purpose.
6 1 This issue awaits resolution by the Australian courts . 
The Full Federal Court in Eastern Express indicated that it would not lightly find t
hat 
below cost pricing breached section 46. Lochhart and Gummow JJ stated :
62 
This Court should be vigilant to ensure that its jurisdiction is not invoked to 
interfere with normal and legitimate competitive pricing activities in the relevant 
market under the guise that such activities are predatory. 
This distinction is difficult to draw in many cases. However, the Australian cases
 provide 
guidance as to the likely approach of the New Zealand courts to an allegation of p
redatory 
pricing under section 36. It is, however, important to bear in mind the warning in
 Eastern 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
GA Hay & K McMahon "Predatory Pricing in an Oligopoly Context" (1995) 3 CCLJ 
144, 154. 
Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp 113 S Ct 2578 (1993). 
Above n 57, 154. 
Hay and MaMahon, above n 57, 155. The authors argue that Victorian Egg woul
d have been 
decided differently if the ability to recoup was required to establish a breach of section
 46 and that 
this indicates that the ability to recoup is not necessarily required. 
Trade Practices Commission Misuse of Market Power: Background Paper and G
uidelines on 
Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 197../, above n 50, 44-45. 
(1992) ATPR41-168, 40,308. 
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Express that the statutory language of the relevant section is crucial. This observatio
n 
applies equally to section 36. 
2 The approach lo predatory pricing in Port Nelson. 
Van Roy has observed that some conduct that is considered to be predatory prici
ng may 
not contravene section 36.
63 Section 36 cannot be used to challenge the pricing decisions 
of firms that do not have market dominance. Nor can section 36 be relied upon wh
ere the 
firm does not "use" its dominant position. Port Nelson demonstrates that below cos
t 
pricing can also be successfully challenged under section 27 of the Act. 
The nature of the $100 minimum charge for pilot services was considered by th
e High 
Court . The amount charged by PNL for pilot services depended on the weight
 of the 
piloted vessel. This charge increased with the weight of the vessel. Howeve
r, PNL 
imposed a minimum charge of $100 for any pilotage services that it provided
. The 
minimum charge primarily affected vessels that operated in the "smaller vessel end
 of the 
market". 64
 The Commerce Commission alleged that a minimum charge which operated in 
this way breached section 2 7 of the Act. The High Court held that the $100 m
inimum 
charge for pilotage services breached section 27 because it had the purpose and
 likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition in the pilotage market. This findin
g was 
upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
The approach of both the High Court and Court of Appeal to the $100 minimum ch
arge is 
noteworthy. Although both Courts relied on overseas authorities which have an
alysed 
predatory pricing, they did not attempt to define predatory pricing or to determ
ine the 
kinds of pricing policies that may or may not amount to predatory pricing. This in
dicates 
the reluctance of the New Zealand courts to enter into the definitional debates tha
t have 
surrounded predatory pricing in the United States. These definitional issues shou
ld not 
63 
64 
Above n 40, 3. 
This term was used by the Court of Appeal to describe the sector of the pilotage mar
ket where the 
piloted vessels weighed less than 2500 GRT. This is the sector of the market where
 the effect of 
the minimum price was the most significant. 
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distract the Court from the inquiry mandated by the Act. Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeal commented that "[i]t is preferable to concentrate on the terms of the statute."
65 In 
the High Court, McGechan J observed that section 27 would be satisfied if:6
6 
the activity has the features of pricing below cost, with associated substantial 
purpose of eliminating or deterring present competition, and the creation of a 
deterrent aggressive reputation. 
McGechan J therefore considered two issues. First, whether the price charged was below 
the cost of providing the good or service. Secondly, whether the purpose, effect or likely 
effect of the $100 minimum charge was to substantially lessen competition in the pilotage 
market. 
(a) Below cost pricing 
The Commerce Commission alleged that the $100 mm1mum charge was substantially 
below the cost of providing pilotage services and was therefore predatory in nature. 
McGechan J held that the cost of providing pilots for vessels less than 2500 GR T was 
"substantially above" the $100 minimum charge. 
67 This result followed irrespective of the 
method used by McGechan J to determine the "cost" .
68 PNL did not seek to challenge 
this finding on appeal. Port Nelson therefore does not decide how cost should be 
calculated for determining whether section 27 has been breached. 
65 
66 
67 
68 
Above n 2, 569. See also the comments ofMcGechan Jin the High Court, above n 39, 538. 
Above n 39, 538. McGechan J had already held that the necessary "contract" existed. 
This is the smaller vessel end of the market. 
McGechan J identified a number of different ways to calculate the cost of providing pilotage 
services. His Honour did not decide which was the most appropriate basis to use to calculate the 
cost as the $100 minimum charge was below all the measures of cost that he identified. 
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(b) Purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition 
The second requirement necessary to establish a breach of section 27 was that the $100 
minimum charge must have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. This element will often be difficult to satisfy where the conduct that is 
alleged to substantially lessen competition is a price reduction. The Court of Appeal 
recognised that price reductions generally reflect competition at work and that therefore 
below cost pricing "will not frequently give rise to competition law concerns".
69 
Where a firm reduces its price below cost, the reduction can be viewed in two ways. 
Either the reduction reflects vigorous competition in a marketplace, or it can be seen as an 
exclusionary measure designed to reduce competition in the marketplace in the long term. 
The Court of Appeal recognised this distinction when it said:
70 
It is not a contravention of s 27 to offer or sell goods or services at less than cost. 
The section requires proof of the substantial lessening of competition - not merely 
aggressive competitive conduct. The purpose or (likely) effect must be more than 
short-term and must impact upon the competitive process in the particular market 
structure. The mere fact that a participant operates in the market at a loss, and 
even fails , will not necessarily lessen competition. 
This is a significant statement as to how below cost pricing will be treated under section 
27. How the price reduction impacts on the competitive process in the market will 
determine whether section 27 applies. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
circumstances that lead McGechan J and the Court of Appeal to conclude that the $100 
minimum charge breached section 27 of the Act. 
69 
70 
Above n 2, 572 . The Court of Appeal cited Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Wi lliamson Tobacco 
Corp, above n 58, in support of this proposition . 
Above n 2, 571. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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The Court of Appeal recognised that the purpose or likely effect of below cost pricing 
must be more than short-term to contravene section 27.
7 1 This accords with the use of the 
word "substantial" when determining whether competition has been substantially lessened. 
The Court of Appeal was faced with the argument that the purpose or likely effect of the 
price reductions could not be to substantially lessen competition unless the firm could 
recoup lost profits by increasing its price once its competition was eliminated. This 
argument was rejected by the Court because, in the circumstances of the case, it ignored 
PNL's ability to cross-subsidise any loss made in the smaller vessel end of the pilotage 
market from profits made on non-contestable services. These non-contestable services 
included pilotage services in the larger vessel end of the market where PNL did not face 
any competition. 
72 Port Nelson therefore establishes that while the ability to recoup losses 
may indicate the anticompetitive purpose or effect of below cost pricing, it is not essential 
to establish a breach of section 2 7. 
73 
The reasoning of McGechan J and the Court of Appeal demonstrates the importance of the 
tug tie's existence in reaching the conclusion that the minimum charge breached section 
27. The tug tie effectively prevented PNL' s competitors from entering the larger vessel 
end of the pilotage market without first entering the tug market. The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that:7
4 
7 1 
72 
73 
74 
because of the effect of the tug tic and the discount (the larger the vessel the 
greater the available discount) upon the existing competitor and potential entrants 
in the pilotage market - effectively confining them to the smaller vessel end of the 
market - the below cost charge by PNL for pilotage must be seen as 
exclusionary .... 
Above n 2, 571. 
The reason why PNL did not face any competition in this sector of the market was because of the 
tug tie. 
Above n 2, 571. 
Above n 2, 572. 
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PNL's expectation in imposing the minimum charge and tug tie was that few
 pilotage tasks 
would have been available to TBMPL in circumstances where PNL's m
inimum charge 
would not apply.
75 The necessary conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal was that the 
below cost pilotage charge was likely to substantially lessen competition. 
This conclusion should not be seen to imply that every instance of below c
ost pricing will 
breach section 27. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that in some circu
mstances below 
cost pricing and minimum charges are no more than aggressive compe
titive conduct. 
McGechan J also recognised that minimum charges have an "accepted
 commercial 
purpose."
76 However, McGechan J did observe that the "commercial community wou
ld 
look askance at a minimum charge outrageously below [the] actual cost 
of the services 
concerned, asking the longer term reason for such deliberate loss takin
g." 77 Whether 
below cost pricing contravenes section 27 will accordingly depend upon t
he purpose and 
effect of the price reductions being considered by the court. 
3 How should predatory pricing be challenged? 
Predatory pricing can now be challenged using both section 27 and se
ction 36. Port 
Nelson and Eastern Express establish that the courts are likely to focus on th
e respective 
statutory requirements to determine whether the pricing policies compla
ined of breach 
either section. The structure of the market and the circumstances surrou
nding the price 
reductions are therefore important considerations. 
The concepts analysed by McGechan J and the Court of Appeal in Port N
elson were 
developed by United States and Australian courts in the context of eac
h jurisdiction' s 
equivalent to section 36 of the Act. The Court of Appeal in particular c
onsidered how 
these concepts apply in the context of section 27. Two factors that are inf
luential in these 
overseas jurisdictions are not required under section 27. 
75 
76 
77 
Above n 2, 570. 
Above n 39, 539. 
Above n 39, 539. 
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Australian courts have held that predatory pricing will contravene section 46 of the ATP A 
where the price reductions are temporary in nature, as this allows the court to infer a 
predatory purpose. There was no indication in Port Nelson that the minimum charge was 
temporary and would be removed when PNL's competitor was eliminated for the pilotage 
market. 78 Secondly, the Court of Appeal held that a firm did not necessarily have to be 
able to recoup any short term losses incurred while eliminating its competition. This is 
inconsistent with the approach of the United States Supreme Court which requires a firm 
to recoup these losses to successfully challenge predatory pricing. 
The background of animosity between PNL and TBMPL and that the minimum charge 
was used in conjunction with the tug tie and the discount provided the basis for McGechan 
J' s finding that the purpose and likely effect of the minimum charge was to substantially 
lessen competition in the pilotage market. This combination of factors may not be present 
in future litigation where predatory pricing is alleged. The precise requirements necessary 
to establish that future instances of below cost pricing breach section 27 are therefore not 
clear. 
Under which section of the Act should predatory pricing be challenged? The Court of 
Appeal in Port Nelson did not clarify what is required to infer an anticompetitive purpose 
for section 36. It is however likely that the same approach to determining the purpose or 
likely effect of below cost pricing for section 27 will be used to determine a firm ' s purpose 
for section 36. The result should normally, although not always, be the same. Whether 
section 27, section 36, or both are used to challenge predatory pricing will therefore often 
depend upon whether a litigant can satisfy the other elements of either section. Recent 
decisions concerning section 36, including Port Nelson, indicate that the requirements of 
section 27 may be easier to satisfy in any given situation. 
78 The argument that the minimum charge was not a sporadic or temporary measure was advanced 
by PNL before the High Court. See above n 39. 532. 
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D Discounts Given For Bundled Goods and Services 
Where a customer purchases more than one good or service from the same supplier, that 
supplier will commonly discount the price that would ordinarily be charged. The amount 
of the discount will often increase as more goods or services are purchased from this 
supplier. The use of discounts in these circumstances is common commercial practice. 
A discount of this nature was used by PNL in Port Nelson. PNL offered a discount on 
"all of the Port Company' s charges" if "all services required" by the vessel were provided 
by PNL and any stevedoring services required by the vessel were provided by a stevedore 
who "uses PNL employees". The service contract defined "all services required" as tugs, 
pilotage and ship lines. These were the services where it was possible for TBMPL, if it so 
chose, to compete with PNL. McGechan J characterised these services as the 
"contestable" services. However, the discount also applied to incontestable services 
including port access, berthage, equipment and wharfage. TBMPL could not compete in 
these areas because of PNL' s natural monopoly. 
McGechan J and the Court of Appeal held that a discount structured in this way 
substantially lessened competition and therefore breached section 27 of the Act. The 
objectionable aspect of the discount was that it applied across both contestable and 
incontestable services. Even if TBMPL could supply contestable services more efficiently 
than PNL, a customer would be likely to purchase contestable services from PNL in order 
to obtain the benefit of the discount that applied to the incontestable services. In order to 
be able to effectively compete, any discount that TBMPL offered would have to exceed 
the combined discount offered by PNL across both contestable and incontestable services. 
This effect was more severe because the incontestable services were essential services. All 
vessels entering the port had no alternative but to use the port services offered by PNL. 
The effect of a discount structured in this way is that the monopoly supplier of 
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incontestable services will eventually achieve a monopoly m the supply of contestable 
services. McGechan J concluded:79 
[I]t is clear the grant by a monopolist of discount across both monopoly and 
contestable lines, conditional upon all lines being taken, could in some factual 
situations have anticompetitive effect. The question cannot be resolved by simple 
rules of thumb . All will depend on factual variables . 
McGechan J then considered why PNL had extended the discount policy to contestable 
services. 80 One purpose of the discount identified by McGechan J was to eliminate 
TBMPL and to send a "warning signal" to potential competitors. The discount effectively 
required PNL' s competitors to reduce the price they charged for contestable services to a 
level that would match the total price charged for PNL' s contestable and incontestable 
services. However, this was not the only reason. PNL sought to justify the use of the 
discount on the basis of commonly adopted commercial practices. Extending the discount 
to contestable services acted as a further incentive for shippers to use PNL' s stevedoring 
labour. The discount also acted as an incentive for shippers to use the contestable services 
offered by PNL. This can be seen as a legitimate response to the competition that PNL 
faced in the pilotage market and to a lesser degree, the tug market. 
McGechan J held that section 27 applied because a real and substantial purpose of the 
discount was to eliminate TBMPL and thereby substantially lessen competition in the 
pilotage market. His Honour reached this conclusion for a number of reasons. PNL 
perceived TBMPL to be an "acute competitive threat". 81 This perception lead to a 
corresponding desire to restrict or eliminate TBMPL from the pilotage market. McGechan 
J further held that there would have been a belief that a discount offered across all services 
supplied by PNL would have been severely detrimental to TBMPL. He concluded:82 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Above n 39, 524. 
The discount was initially offered across incontestable services with the intention of maintaining 
the use of PNL's stevedoring labour. See above n 39, 525 and generally Union Shipping NZ Ltd v 
Port Ne lson Ltd, above n 36. 
Above n 39, 525 . 
Above n 39, 528. 
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Except for small vessels , with short stays, which would incur relatively lower PNL 
charges and for which the discount would be correspondingly lower. the discount 
would be well nigh unmatchable by TBMPL. 
29 
Therefore the structure of the discount and the animosity between PNL and TBMPL 
allowed McGechan J to find that the purpose of the discount was to eliminate TBMPL 
from the pilotage market and to deter other competitors. McGechan J' s finding was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The Court stated that PNL's awareness of the 
competitive threat and its determination to resist this threat were demonstrated by the tug 
tie . 
McGechan J also found that the likely effect, although not the actual effect, of the five 
percent discount was to substantially lessen competition in the pilotage market. The likely 
effect of discount would be to devastate TBMPL, especially when considered in light of 
the tug tie and $100 minimum charge. 83 That this did not occur was, in McGechan J' s 
view, unexpected. The Court of Appeal did not consider McGechan J's findings 
concerning the actual and likely effect of the discount to be inconsistent. 84 
Both McGechan J and the Court of Appeal were influenced by the combined effect of the 
conduct undertaken by PNL when assessing the likely effect of the five percent discount 
on the pilotage market. Whether the same result would have been reached had the five 
percent discount been the only form of predatory conduct used by PNL is unclear. Porl 
Nelson provides the basis for the argument that offering discounts for bundled services 
will, in some circumstances, breach section 27 . 
83 
84 
Above n 39, 530-531. 
See Part IV. 
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IV THE WIDTH OF SECTION 27 AFTER PORT NELSON 
The scope of section 27 is largely determined by how the courts interpret each of the 
purpose, effect and likely effect limbs. The decision in Port Nelson has widened the scope 
of section 27 . This Part considers how the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
interpreted certain aspects of section 27 and whether these interpretations are consistent 
with the purpose of the section. 
A The "Purpose" Limb of Section 2 7 
Section 27 commonly applies to horizontal agreements that are entered into between 
competitors for the purpose of substantially lessening competition. The parties to these 
agreements share the same anticompetitive purpose because they collude in order to secure 
the commitment of the other parties to an agreed course of action. 
This typical situation can be contrasted with the situation in Port Nelson. The potentially 
anticompetitive provisions were contained in the contract for services to be provided by 
PNL to its customers. The High Court held that PNL's "real and substantial" purpose in 
entering into these contracts was to substantially lessen competition in the pilotage market. 
The counterparty to these contracts, the customer, may have been aware of PNL's 
purpose, but did not share the same purpose. The element of collusion that is often 
present in horizontal anticompetitive agreements did not exist between PNL and its 
customers. The question to be decided by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Port 
Nelson was whether section 27 would apply where the anticompetitive purpose was held 
by only one of the parties to the contract. 
The Court of Appeal, relying on both New Zealand and Australian authorities, held that it 
was sufficient if only one of the parties to the contract had an anticompetitive purpose. 
Gault J expressed concern that if the Court required the purpose of the contract to be 
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shared by all parties, the effectiveness of section 27 would be considerably limited. He 
said :85 
The objective of the statutory prov1s10n must also be borne in mind. The 
promotion of competition should not be inhibited by the artificiality of search for 
unammous purposes . 
Gault J supported this decision by reference to Tui Foods Ltd v New Zealand Milk 
Corporation Ltd 86 This case concerned the application of section 29 of the Act to an 
allegedly exclusionary contract. Cooke P held that it if only one party is responsible for 
including an anticompetitive clause in a contract, then that person ' s anticompetitive 
purpose is sufficient to establish a breach of section 29. Once a contract is concluded then 
all parties must be taken to share the purpose of its provisions. 87 Gault J expressly stated 
that this reasoning was equally applicable to section 27. 88 
Another influential authority relied on by Gault J in Port Nelson was ASX Operations Pty 
Ltd v Pont Data A ustra/ia Pty Ltd. 89 This case concerned the sale of data by the 
Australian Stock Exchange to two competing firms which on-sold the data. The Exchange 
required one firm to agree to certain contractual terms which disadvantaged that firm 
against its competitor. This competitor was a subsidiary of the Exchange. In considering 
the scope of section 45 of the ATP A, the Full Federal Court commented that section 45 
"operates upon contracts which will be between two or more parties, some of whom may 
not have the proscribed purpose". 90 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Above n 2, 564. 
(1993) 5 TCLR 406 (CA). 
Cooke P ' s interpretation of section 2(5)(a) formed the basis of this conclusion. 
The Court of Appeal 's reliance on section 2(5)(a) has been criticised in LF Hampton "Port 
Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission: Has the Court of Appeal read the need for concerted action 
out of s 27 of the Commerce Act?" presented at the Eight Annual Workshop of the Competition 
Law and Policy Institute of New Zealand Inc (Auckland, 1996). Hampton argues that section 
2(5)(a) is not relevant to determining whether "purpose" in section 27 requires unilateral or 
common purpose. 
(1991) ATPR 41-069. 
Above n 89, 52,059. Section 45 of the ATPA is the Australian equivalent of section 27 of the 
Act. 
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The Court of Appeal did not however consider the number of authorities which indicate 
that all parties to the contract must have the purpose of substantially lessening 
competition. 9 1 Perhaps the most significant of these is the decision of the Federal Court in 
Carlton and United Breweries (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bond Brewing New South Wales Ltd. 
92 
This case concerned an exclusionary agreement which was challenged under section 
45(2)(a)(i) of the ATPA. Wilcox J held that the section required both parties to the 
contract to share the anticompetitive purpose. The decision in Carlton was not considered 
by either Court in Port Nelson. 93 
Hampton is also critical of the Court of Appeal ' s decision in Port Nelson. He argues that 
the Court of Appeal's approach is "conceptually unsound and fails to take into account 
the genesis of s 27" by focusing on the purpose of the party responsible for including the 
anticompetitive provision in the contract.
94 The essence of Hampton ' s argument is 
summarised in the following passage:95 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
If one proceeds on the assumption that the words "contract, arrangement or 
understanding" in the context of the Commerce Act import concerted action, the 
common versus unilateral purpose issue becomes of much less importance than it 
has assumed in the cases . ln a horizontal arrangement unity of purpose or a 
meeting of minds is likely to be evident. In a vertical relationshjp, the key issue is 
not whether the parties share the same purpose but rather whether they are 
commjtted to a common course of anti-competitive conduct sufficient to trigger 
liability under the requisite purpose or effect test. Under this approach s 2(5) does 
not have any significant role to play. On policy grounds, commitment secured by 
coercion should be condemned. 
These authorities include New Zealand Magic Ali/lions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd, above n 
32 and Stevedoring Services (Nelson) Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd, above n 36. 
(1987) ATPR 40-820. 
The Court of Appeal also ignored the decision of Burchett Jin News Ltd v ARL (1996) 135 ALR 
33, which sought to limit the application of AS.X. Burchett J's analysis supported the requirement 
that the parties to a contract must share a common purpose. 
Above n 88, I . 
Above n 88, 15-16. 
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Hampton' s view is based on United States case law which has interpreted section 1 of the 
Sherman Act 1890. This section, which is broadly similar to section 27, requires concerted 
action between two or more firms to achieve an anticompetitive objective.96 Where a 
horizontal agreement between competitors is being challenged, the agreement breaches the 
Sherman Act where the conspirators have a "unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement" .
97 Unity of purpose is 
unlikely to be present in many vertical agreements because the parties entering into the 
agreement are likely to have different purposes for doing so. This does not however mean 
that anticompetitive vertical agreements escape condemnation under the Sherman Act. 
These agreements are illegal where the parties show "a conscious commitment to a 
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective".
98 This commitment may be 
voluntary or secured by coercion. 
Hampton argues that the United States tests described above should be preferred to the 
unilateral purpose approach adopted in Port Nelson. Section 27 would apply in a "more 
principled" way and would still be effective in challenging anticompetitive conduct.
99 
Hampton's approach arguably reflects the policy underlying section 27 more closely than 
does the Court of Appeal's approach in Port Nelson. 100 Hampton does, however, 
acknowledge the strength of the Court of Appeal's reasoning when he assesses whether 
future courts will depart from the approach in Port Nelson: 101 
96 
97 
98 
99 
JOO 
101 
See above n 88, 2-3. For further analysis, see BC Allan Shifting Ground within the Commerce 
Act: Is the need for Collusion Dead? (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 
1996). 
American Tobacco Co v United States 328 US 781 , 783 (1946). 
Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp 465 US 752. 763 (1963). 
Hampton observes that the outcomes in Carlton and United, Magic Millions, Stevedoring 
Services would not change as a result of applying the United States tests. However, the result on 
this aspect of Port Nelson would have been different. 
The argument can be made that the Court of Appeal had due regard to the policy underlying 
section 27 because its finding that unilateral purpose was sufficient was based on section 2(5)(a). 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that section 2(5)(a) supports this finding because it requires the 
provisions of a contract rather than the contract itself to be the focus of the section 27 inquiry. 
Hampton questions the validity of this argument. He argues that focusing on the provision in the 
contract does not reflect any policy change concerning the substantive operation of section 27 and 
section 2(5)(a) should not be used to reject the concept of concerted action. 
Above n 88, 16. Given the strength of the Court of Appeal ' s reasoning (which is summarised 
above n JOO), this may provide a basis upon which subsequent courts can distinguish Port Nelson . 
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In light of the Court of Appeal ' s decision in Port Nelson is there any scope for the 
application of the approach advocated above? Probably not in the case of 
contracts; however, in the case of arrangements and understandings concerted 
action would still seem to be an essential requirement. 
Whether Hampton' s approach will be adopted by the courts remains to be determined. 
This aspect of Port Nelson widens the scope of section 27. A litigant need now only show 
that one party to the contract has an anticompetitive purpose. This is not of such 
significance where the allegedly anticompetitive contract is entered into between 
competitors, as, generally speaking, all the parties to this type of contract will share the 
same purpose. Section 27 has clearly always applied to these kinds of contracts. 
102 The 
finding is however significant in the context of anticompetitive agreements that are not 
made between competitors. The contracts for the supply of services that were at issue in 
Port Nelson provide a good example. Where one party includes an anticompetitive clause 
in a standard form supply contract, which the counterparty may not even be aware of, all 
parties to that contract are potentially liable for any breach of section 27 of the Act.
103 
The question raised by the Court of Appeal ' s adoption of a unilateral purpose test is 
whether section 27 should be available to challenge the conduct of a party who does not 
have an anticompetitive purpose. It is difficult to imagine that Parliament could have 
intended that a customer who purchases goods or services from a supplier who is using 
that supply contract to eliminate a competitor from the market would breach the Act. 
There should, in principle, be no objection to a customer who uses the prevailing market 
conditions to achieve the best bargain that he or she can. Merely taking advantage of such 
contractual conditions does not mean that the customer who purchases the services should 
102 
103 
An example is Re Chemists · Guild of New Zealand (Inc), above n 28. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that on this interpretation a party may contravene section 27 
in ignorance. This concern was not considered significant. See above n 2, 564. 
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be attributed the purpose of excluding a participant from the relevant market. 
104 Such an 
approach does not conform with commercial reality. 
Hampton is advocating an approach that is more conceptually correct than the approach 
adopted in Port Nelson. However, the reasoning in Port Nelson would be different had 
Hampton's approach been adopted. Because only PNL would have been committed to 
eliminating its competitors from the pilotage market, the purpose limb of section 27 would 
not have been satisfied. The Commerce Commission would therefore have to have 
challenged PNL's conduct using the "effect" or "likely effect" limbs of section 27, or 
section 36. 
B Substantial Lessening of Competition in the Pilotage Market 
I The "effect " and the "likely effect" limbs of section 2 7 
McGechan J held that for conduct to have the effect of substantially lessening competition, 
that conduct must cause a lessening of competition that is "more than insubstantial or 
nominal". 105 This interpretation was clearly supported by the relevant authorities. 
106 
McGechan J however held that neither the five percent discount nor the $100 minimum 
charge had the effect of substantially lessening competition. The reason given for this 
finding was that despite PNL's clear efforts, these measures had not succeeded in 
eliminating TBMPL from the pilotage market. 
The Commerce Commission appealed against McGechan J' s finding that the five percent 
discount did not substantially lessen competition. After recognising that "[ c ]ompetition 
104 
105 
106 
Carlton and United Breweries (NSWJ Pty Lid v Bond Brewing New South Wales Lid, above n 92, 
48,880. See also A Borrowdale (ed) Butterworths Commercial law in New Zealand (3 ed, 
Wellington, Butterworths, 1996) 653. 
Above n 39, 434. 
Tillmans Butcheries Pty Lid v Australasian Meat industry Employees' Union (1979) 27 ALR 367; 
Mobil Oil Corp v The Queen in Right of New Zealand (unreported, 4 May 1989, International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Washington DC. International Arbitral Tribunal 
Case ARB/87/2); Fisher & Paykel v Commerce Commission, above n 7. 
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had emerged [in the pilotage market] but subject to continued hindrance", the Court of 
A 1 · d 107 ppea contmue : 
Of course in practical situations workable and effective competition in a market 
may develop in the face of anti-competitive conduct and the point will be reached 
where that conduct no longer can be said substantially to lessen competition. We 
are handicapped at the appellate level in making any assessment as to whether that 
point was reached at Port Nelson in the pilot services market and when. 
The Court of Appeal appeared to disagree with McGechan J' s reasoning concerning the 
actual effect of the five percent discount. 
108 Despite these indications, the Court of Appeal 
did not overrule McGechan J' s finding on the basis that it would make no practical 
difference to the outcome of the case. This implicit criticism appears wholly justified. The 
synergistic effect of the five percent discount and the tug tie on TBMPL would have been 
severe. TBMPL could not compete in the upper pilotage market, which comprised a 
significant portion of the overall pilotage market. Competition must surely have been 
hindered by these measures, even though TBMPL had managed to survive. McGechan J' s 
conclusion that a " substantial" lessening of competition had not occurred seems open to 
argument. 
109 
McGechan J and the Court of Appeal also held that the likely effect of both the five 
percent discount and the minimum charge was to substantially lessen competition. 
McGechan J acknowledged the Australian Federal Court ' s comments in Tillmans 
Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat lndushy Employees ' Union
11 0 concerning the 
107 
108 
109 
I JO 
Above n 2, 566. 
The Court of Appeal impliedly disapproved of both the reasons given by MeGechan J for finding 
that the five percent discount breached section 27. Gault J said (at page 566): "The discount, 
because of it structure, affected competition in the pilotage market. Also, because of its structure, 
it affected competition in the tug market. That a particular competitor has secured business in the 
pilotage market by subjecting itself to the impact of the discount also in the tug market seems an 
unconvincing reason for concluding that the impact no longer exists in the pilotage market. Nor 
should the temporary presence of artificial constraints bear upon the issue." 
An argument can be made that a "substantial" lessening of competition can occur 
notwithstanding the fact that TBMPL was not actually eliminated from the pilotage market. If 
accepted, this view would mean that the actual effect limb of section 27 was also satisfied. 
Above n 106. 
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advantages inherent in retrospectively assessing the likely effect of the conduct. In 
Tillmans, Deane J commented that: 
111 
if conduct had run its ordinary course and had not had the specified effect, it would 
be but rarely that a court would feel justified in disregarding the lesson of the event 
and finding that while the conduct did not have the specified effect it had been 
more likely than not that it would have that effect. 
McGechan J thought that the circumstances in Port Nelson justified departing from the 
approach adopted in Tillmans. His Honour justified this decision on the basis that 
TBMPL's continued survival was probably attributable to the "freezing" effect of the 
Commerce Commission ' s ongoing investigation and the subsequent litigation.
11 2 
Although McGechan J' s finding concerning likely effects may seem unusual in light of his 
earlier findings in relation to the actual effect of the conduct, there is no reason why this is 
necessarily so. In this regard, the Court of Appeal commented that: 
11 3 
the decision that the actual effect was not a substantial lessening of competition in 
the pilotage market is neither inconsistent with, nor undermines, the decision that 
that was a likely effect when it was introduced. 
In light of the rather unique circumstances in Port Nelson, it is unlikely that such a result 
will occur frequently . The significance of this aspect of the judgment should not therefore 
be over-estimated. 
2 Conduct effecting only part of a market 
PNL sought to challenge McGechan J' s finding that the $100 minimum charge had the 
purpose and the likely effect of substantially lessening competition in the pilotage market. 
Ill 
112 
113 
Above n 106, 381-382. 
Above n 39, 542. 
Above n 2, 567. 
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The essence of PNL' s challenge was that the minimum charge did not substantially lessen 
competition in the pilotage market because PNL's competitors could enter the larger 
vessel end of the pilotage market. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument because it 
ignored the fact that the tug tie effectively confined PNL' s competitors to the smaller 
vessel end of the pilotage market. The requirement for PNL to enter the tug market to 
effectively compete in the pilotage market was itself anticompetitive. 
114 
The Court of Appeal recognised the important principle that section 27 can potentially 
apply where competition is lessened in only a part of the market rather than the whole 
market. Gault J stated : 
115 
Taken more broadly, however, it cannot be the case that competition in a market is 
not substantially lessened unless competition across the whole of the market is 
lessened. 
This statement indicates that a substantial lessening of competition sufficient to breach 
section 27 can occur where the alleged anticompetitive conduct only effects part of the 
market rather than the whole of the market. Gault J' s approach is characteristic of the 
broad interpretation given to section 27 in Port Nelson. 
C Elimination of One Competitor 
The courts generally look toward the effect of the conduct on the level of competition in 
the market rather than its effect on individual competitors in the market to determine 
whether competition has been substantially lessened. 
116 This distinction was recognised by 
the Court of Appeal in Port Nelson in the following terms : 
117 
114 
11 5 
11 6 
11 7 
Above n 2, 571. 
Above n 2, 571 . The same argument had previously been accepted in The New Zealand 
Vegetable Growers Federation (Inc) v The Commerce Commission (No 3) (1986) 2 TCLR 583 , 
588-589. This passage was however not referred to by the Court of Appeal in Port Nelson . 
Gault on Commercial Law, above n 27, CA 27.15; Fisher & Payke/, above n 7. 
Above n 2, 564-565. 
Challenging Predatory Conduct Under the Commerce !let 1986 39 
The relevant inquiry is as to substantially lessening competition . That is not the 
same as substantially lessening the effectiveness of a particular competitor. 
Competition in a market is a much broader concept. It is defined in s 3(1) as 
meaning ''workable and effective competition". That encompasses a market 
framework which participants may enter and in which they may engage in 
rivalrous behaviour with the expectation of deriving advantage from greater 
efficiency. 
The decision in Port Nelson is significant because it demonstrates that predatory conduct 
directed at one competitor can itself substantially lessen competition. McGechan J held 
that the purpose and likely effect of both the discount and the minimum charge was to 
eliminate TBMPL from the pilotage market and to deter potential competitors from 
entering the market, thereby substantially lessening competition in the market. 
PNL challenged McGechan J's findings on the basis that he focused on the likely effect on 
TBMPL of the discount and the minimum charge, rather than on the likely effect on the 
level of competition in the market. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument because 
the distinction between lessening competition and lessening the effectiveness of a particular 
competitor was not relevant where no other competitors were in, nor seeking to enter, the 
pilotage market. 118 Because PNL only faced competition from TBMPL, the elimination of 
TBMPL from the pilotage market would almost inevitably result in the level of competitive 
activity undertaken in that market being lessened . The Court of Appeal's reasoning can 
usefully be compared with how the Australian courts have analysed conduct that is 
directed at a particular competitor. 
The Australian courts have also recognised that the competition test is concerned with the 
level of rivalrous behaviour in the market and not with the fate of individual 
competitors. 119 Corones has however identified two situations where conduct directed at 
118 
11 9 
Above n 2, 565. 
Outboard Marine Australia P(v Ltd v Hecar investments (No 6) Pty Ltd ( 1982) ATPR 40-327; 
See also SG Corones Competition Law and Policy in A ustralia (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 
1994), 108. 
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an individual competitor can substantially lessen competition. 
120 These situations are 
broadly similar to those identified in Port Nelson. The first is where a particularly 
significant competitor is eliminated from a market. 
12 1 A likely consequence of such a firm 
being eliminated from a market would be a reduction in the level of competitive activity in 
that market. Section 45 of the ATPA may potentially apply in this situation. The second 
situation is where one firm ' s elimination operates to intimidate other competitors in the 
market. Intimidation of this nature may substantially lessen competition in a market 
because the remaining firms may feel constrained to compete in a certain way in the future . 
Corones ' analysis demonstrates that the approach adopted by McGechan J and affirmed by 
the Court of Appeal in Port Nelson broadly accords with Australian case law. 
Whether conduct directed at a particular competitor will breach section 27 will depend on 
the surrounding circumstances. Just because a firm ' s purpose is to eliminate a competitor 
or to prevent a competitor from competing does not necessarily mean that competition in 
the market has been substantially lessened . Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd
122 
illustrates this point. PNL sought to require a stevedoring company ("USSL") to enter 
into a contract requiring USSL to only use PNL equipment or to pay a "wharf user 
levy". 123 The Court held that this requirement breached section 36(1)(b) of the Act 
because its purpose was to prevent or deter competitive conduct by USSL. 
124 
The Court then considered whether this contract, if it had been entered into, would breach 
section 27 .125 Even though USSL controlled 90% of the Nelson stevedoring market, the 
Court held that PNL' s action to prevent USSL competing in that market would not breach 
120 
I 21 
122 
I 23 
124 
125 
Above n 119. 108-110. 
This point was recognised in Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd, above 
n 16, 43 ,898 and Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursi/I Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) ATPR 40-809. 
Although these cases focus on section 4 7 of the ATPA which seeks to prohibit exclusive dealing, 
the Court ' s analysis of the kinds of conduct that can amount to a substantial lessening of 
competition is however equally applicable to section 27 of the Act. 
Above n 36. 
Above n 36, 713. 
USSL had been found to be dominant in the stevedoring market and seeking to impose restrictive 
contractual terms was found to be a use of that dominant position. 
USSL alleged that by attempting to induce it to enter this contract, PNL breached section 82(l)(c) 
of the Act. Section 27 itself could not be contravened because the relevant contract was not 
actually entered into. 
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section 27. Such a detriment to USSL did not necessarily substantially lessen competition 
in the stevedoring market. Rather, the Court recognised that competition may be 
enhanced: 126 
A loss by USSL of some competitive edge (should such occur) might be balanced 
by competition in the market overall through enhanced opportunity for entry and 
competitive operation by other operators . 
The evidence therefore did not establish that the contract would substantially lessen 
competition in the market as a whole. Union Shipping shows the importance of looking 
past the effect of a contractual restriction on an individual competitor and assessing its 
effect on competition in the relevant market. Section 27 will often be contravened where a 
significant competitor is prevented from competing in, or eliminated from, a market. 
However, this result will not always follow. A firm ' s conduct will not necessarily 
contravene section 27 just because it contravenes section 36. Because the inquiry required 
by section 27 centres on competition in a market, it is broader than the inquiry required by 
section 36. The effect on the market, rather than just one competitor, must be considered. 
Port Nelson demonstrates that predatory conduct directed at another significant 
competitor or potential competitor in a market may substantially lessen competition. This 
result is consistent with preceding decisions and does not represent a significant extension 
of section 2 7' s scope. 
D The Cumulative Effect of Conduct 
The Court of Appeal placed considerable significance on the existence of the tug tie in 
finding that the discount and the minimum charge breached section 27 of the Act. When 
considering the minimum charge, the Court of Appeal stated: 
127 
126 
127 
Above n 36, 715 . 
Above n 2, 571-572 . 
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In any event it is artificial to consider the minimum charge separately from the 
other steps taken by PNL. It is not just the combined effect of the tie and the 
minimum price but the combined, perhaps synergistic, effect of the tie, the 
discount and the minimum charge. 
42 
The combined effect of PNL' s conduct clearly influenced the Court in finding that the 
discount and the minimum charge breached section 27. Does this mean that section 27 
cannot be contravened where one instance of predatory conduct occurs in isolation? It 
would be a mistake for future courts to interpret Port Nelson in this way. 
Whether a breach of section 27 can be made out in any particular instance will depend 
upon the purpose, effect and likely effect of that conduct. This requires the Court to 
compare the level of competitive activity before and after the conduct complained about 
has occurred. The situation in Port Nelson is almost extreme - the evidence clearly 
demonstrated that PNL deliberately acted with the purpose of eliminating its existing 
competitors and seeking to deter others from entering the market. While the "synergistic" 
effect of the conduct no doubt contributed to result, it should not be seen as a requirement 
for future cases. 
E Summary of Legal Interpretations of Section 2 7 
Port Nelson is a significant decision because the unilateral conduct of a dominant firm was 
successfully challenged using section 27. Unilateral conduct had not previously been 
challenged using this section. The Court of Appeal 's interpretation of section 27 in these 
circumstances is inconsistent with the policy underlying the section and fundamentally 
changes the scheme of the Act. This approach was possible because of the Court of 
Appeal ' s decision that section 27 applies to contracts where not all the parties to that 
contract share an anticompetitive purpose. Whether it is conceptually correct to widen 
section 27 is this way is a question that needs to be revisited by the Court of Appeal in the 
future . 
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The Court of Appeal ' s analysis of the other aspects of section 27 considered in this Part is 
less controversial and is consistent with the policy underlying the section. The significance 
attached to the combined effect of the discount, the minimum charge and the tug tie was 
appropriate in the circumstances. Potentially controversial conclusions, such as the tension 
between the result concerning the effect and likely effect limbs, were convincingly 
explained. The analysis of these aspects of section 27 will no doubt assist future courts in 
considering how section 27 applies to predatory conduct. 
V THE NARROWING OF SECTION 36 
Part IV demonstrates that the Court of Appeal applied section 27 expansively in Port 
Nelson. Section 27 can accordingly be used to challenge different types of predatory 
conduct in the future . This can be contrasted with the restrictive interpretation that recent 
courts have given to section 36. Although a comprehensive analysis of section 36 is 
outside the scope of this paper, it is necessary to consider the implications of the courts ' 
narrow interpretation of section 36 in the context of predatory conduct. 
A A Narrower Interpretation of Section 36 
The elements that must be proved to establish a breach of section 36 were briefly 
summarised in Part II of this paper. To establish that a particular kind of predatory 
conduct breaches section 36, it is necessary to satisfy each of these elements. Predatory 
conduct undertaken by a firm which is not dominant in a market cannot be challenged 
using section 36. The firm must also have used its dominance for one of the purposes 
proscribed by section 36. While all the elements of section 36 must be satisfied, the "use" 
element will be the most difficult to satisfy where section 36 is used to challenge predatory 
conduct. This difficulty stems largely from the Privy Council decision in Telecom 
Co,poralion of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd. 
128 
128 Above n 19. 
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The dispute in Clear Communications focused on the amount which Telecom should 
charge Clear for allowing Clear to interconnect with its national telephone network. The 
central issue was whether the "Baumol-Willig" rule proposed by Telecom to determine 
the appropriate price for interconnection to its network breached section 36 of the Act.
129 
The Privy Council held that Telecom had not used its dominant position in the national 
telephone market for one of the proscribed purposes. This result followed from the 
narrow interpretation given to the "use" element of section 36. 
130 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson stated the test for determining whether the "use" element existed as follows: 
131 
it cannot be said that a person in a dominant market position "uses" that position 
for the purposes of s 36 fif] he acts in a way which a person not in a dominant 
position but otherwise in the same circumstances would have acted. 
Applying this test, the Privy Council held that a hypothetical firm in a fully contestable 
market would use the Baumol-Willig rule to determine the price that it would charge for 
supplying a component of a service to a competitor.
132 Telecom therefore could not be 
said to have "used" its dominant position in the relevant market. 
The Privy Council further held that Telecom' s reliance on the Baumol-Willig rule meant 
that it had the purpose of deterring competition. However, the Privy Council ' s decision 
concerning the "use" element of section 36 was the crucial finding that determined the 
outcome of the case. 
133 The importance of establishing the "use" element in future cases 
is illustrated by Lord Browne-Wilkinson when he said : 
134 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
Telecom has monopoly control over the local telephone network, the PSTN. Telecom did no
t 
dispute that Clear should be allowed access to that network, but did dispute the terms and cost o
f 
access. The Baumol-Willig rnle was a pricing rnle relied upon by Telecom during the litigation
. 
In essence, the Baumol-Willig rnle allowed Telecom to charge Clear its opportunity cost fo
r 
allowing it access to the PSTN. The major criticism of the rnle by the Court of Appeal was that 
it 
allowed Telecom to charge Clear monopoly rents. 
See further Y van Roy. above n 2, 55 . 
Above n 19, 403 . 
See further RJ Ahdar "Battles in New Zealand 's Deregulated Telecommunications Industry" 
(1995) 23 ABLR 77, 103-104. 
See van Roy, above n 1, 56. 
Above n 19, 402. 
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If a person has used his dominant position it is hard to imagine a case in which he 
would have done so otherwise than for the purpose of producing an anti-
competitive effect; there will be no need to use the dominant position in the process 
of ordinary competition . 
This is a major change from the approach previously adopted by the courts, which tended 
to focus on the "purpose" element of section 36. The Privy Council's decision 
fundamentally changes how section 36 is likely to apply in the future. 
B Critique of the Privy Council's Test 
The test for the "use" element has already been subject to severe academic criticism. 
135 
One of the main criticisms of the decision is that it removes the flexibility that the courts 
previously had to adopt different formulations of the "use" test as were appropriate to the 
circumstances.136 The Privy Council ' s test for "use" therefore dramatically reduces the 
types of conduct that can be found by a Court to contravene section 36. Van Roy argues 
that this is because most of the predatory conduct that can be undertaken by a dominant 
firm can also be undertaken by a firm that falls slightly short of being dominant in the 
market. 137 Any behaviour that a non-dominant firm in the same circumstances would have 
engaged in will not breach section 36. 
The restrictive nature of the Privy Council ' s test is clearly demonstrated by a comparison 
of the test with those applied by previous courts. The decision of the High Court of 
Australia in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co Ltd138 concerned the refusal of 
135 
136 
137 
138 
See van Roy, above n 1 and Y van Roy '" Abuse of a Dominant Position ' in New Zealand 
Competition Legislation" [ 1995 J 7 ECLR 428. For a contrary view, from an Australian 
commentator, see W Pengilley "The Privy Council Speaks on Essential Facilities Access in New 
Zealand: What are the Australasian Lessons?" ( 1995) 3 CCLJ 26, 44. 
This point is alluded to by van Roy, above n 1, 58. 
Van Roy, above n 1, 58. An example would be predatory conduct undertaken by a firm that has a 
"substantial market power" (The equivalent test under section 46 of the A TP A). 
Above n 43 . A number of Australian commentators have analysed Queensland Wire. Two useful 
articles are K McMahon "Refusals to Supply by Corporations with Substantial Market Power" 
(1994) 22 ALBR 7 and SJ Weisman "ln Queensland /Vire, The High Court has Provided an 
Elegant Backstop to "Use" of Market Power" ( 1995) 2 CCLJ 280. In the later article, Weisman 
convincingly argues that the test in Queensland /Vire is useful because it requires the Court to 
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a dominant firm to supply a product to another firm. The High Court held that the phrase 
"take advantage of' was a neutral term and should not given a pejorative interpretation. 
Queensland Wire shows that the "use" element is not the test used to distinguish the 
legitimate use by a firm of its dominant position from a misuse of that dominant position. 
That is the function of the "purpose" element in section 36.
139 This was expressly 
recognised by Mason CJ and Wilson J:
140 
[Section] 46 already contains an anti-competitive purpose element. It stipulates 
that an infringement may be found only where the market power is taken 
advantage of for a purpose proscribed in para (a) , (b) or (c) . It is these purpose 
provisions which define what uses of market power constitute misuses . 
Rather, the role of the "use" element had been thought to be to provide a causal 
connection between the dominant firm and its conduct.
141 Hampton states: 
142 
Now it is firmly established that the " use" or "take advantage of' element does 
not imply any notion of misuse, attention is likely to focus on the ' 'causation" 
requirement inherent in the words "use that position" . These words imply that 
there must be a connection between the impugned behaviour and the dominant 
position . The precise nature of this connection, however, is open to argument. 
Queensland Wire established that the "use" element will be satisfied where the conduct in 
question was only made possible by the absence of competitive conditions. 
143 This was, 
however, only one way to establish the causal connection between the dominant firm and 
its conduct. The courts were prepared to adopt different tests to establish the necessary 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable conduct when determining whether section 46 
of the A TP A has been breached. 
See the discussion by Hampton in Ahdar (ed), above n 18, 195-197 and by Y van Roy '" Abuse of 
a Dominant Position ' in New Zealand Competition Legislation", above n 135, 435. 
Above n 43 , 50,010. 
See van Roy, above n 1, 56-57 and the cases cited therein. See also JM November "The Meaning 
of "Use" of a Dominant Position: from Queensland Wire to Electricity Corp v Geotherm Energy 
(1993) 23 VUWLR 191. 
Above n 18, 197. 
See van Roy, above n I. 57 and FH Hanks & PLW Williams "Implications of the Decision of the 
High Court in Queensland Wire" (1990) MULR 437. 
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causal connection where the circumstances required it. An example is Electricity 
Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy. 
144 This case concerned public statements by a 
dominant firm that it would enforce certain legal rights. These statements were intended 
to deter competitors from entering the relevant market. This conduct therefore occurred 
outside the market. The Court of Appeal held that section 36 could apply to conduct that 
influenced market activity, provided that "a clear and direct link between the influence and 
the dominant position" could be shown. 
145 Geotherm demonstrates that by adopting a test 
for "use" that was appropriate to the circumstances, the court was left with sufficient 
flexibility to find that the alleged conduct was a use of a dominant position. Rather than 
simply focusing on the "use" element, the Court of Appeal also placed significance on the 
"purpose" element of section 36: 
146 
The distinction between vigorous legitimate competition by a corporation with 
substantial market power and conduct that contravenes the section is in the 
purpose of the conduct. Market power can be exercised legitimately or 
illegitimately. 
The test adopted by the Privy Council in Clear Communications is significantly more 
restrictive than the tests developed in previous cases. The Privy Council held that a firm 
will not use its dominant position if the firm acts in the same way as a non-dominant firm 
(b h · · h · ) 147 ut ot erw1se m t e same c1rcumstances . Van Roy is highly critical of this test 
because it exhaustively states the circumstances in which a firm does not use its dominant 
144 
145 
146 
147 
Above n 43. 
Above n 43 , 649. The Queensland Wire test would not be satisfied in this situation because a 
non-dominant firm could have made similar public statements. 
Above n 43 , 649. This is similar to the approach in Eastern Express, above n 52 and New 
Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd, above n 32. 
This point has been recognised by Master Venning in Commerce Commission v Southpower 
Limited (unreported, High Court, Christchurch Registry, 8 August 1997, CP 26/97). This was an 
interlocutory application concerning how the plaintiff should frame its pleadings. The Court 
considered the scope of section 36 in light of Clear Communications and Port Nelson. Master 
Yenning reached the conclusion (at pages 11-12) that section 36 "imposes a negative obligation 
on a dominant party not to use its dominance for an anti-competitive purpose. The section docs 
not impose positive obligations. '' 
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position. 148 She argues that this eliminates the possibility of using other tests to satisfy the 
"use" element, as was done in Geotherm. The effect of such a narrow interpretation is 
that conduct which has previously been held to contravene section 36 (or section 46 of the 
ATPA) will now be excluded from the ambit of section 36. 
Whether a particular type of conduct satisfies the test in Clear Communications will 
depend upon how the court characterises the conduct. Van Roy argues that where the 
conduct is defined narrowly, for instance, pricing below cost, the "use" element will not 
be satisfied, as both dominant and non-dominant firms can legitimately price below cost. 
Conversely, where the anti-competitive purpose is identified as the reason for the below 
cost pricing, such conduct is more likely to satisfy the "use" element of section 36, 
because only a dominant firm will be able to price below cost to eliminate or reduce 
· · 149 competition. Characterisation issues of this nature demonstrate the difficulty, 
recognised in Geotherm, of analysing the "use" and "purpose" requirements 
separately. 
150 
The Privy Council's decision has been further criticised on the basis that it is unprincipled 
to decide whether a firm has used its dominant position by assessing whether a 
hypothetical firm in a competitive market would behave in the same way. This argument 
has recently been made by Ahdar: 
15 1 
148 
149 
150 
151 
With respect, [the Privy Council ' s] approach to causation is extremely artificial 
and prone to mislead . There is an air of unreality in asking how a non-dominant 
firm in a competitive market would have priced its essential facility . The very 
question strikes one as odd, as sort of an antitrust oxymoron. . .. [H]ow Telecom 
would have acted in another setting, a competitive market (one where its source of 
A similar point is made by Al van Melle "Refusals to License Intellectual Property Rights: the 
Impact of RTE v EC Commission (Magill) on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law" 
(I 997) 25 ABLR 4, 27-31. 
See van Roy, above n I. 58. The example given by van Roy concerns a refusal to supply. 
This difficulty was also recognised in Queensland Wire, above n 43 . 
Above n 132, 103 . 
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dominance, network controL would ex hypothesi not be present), 1s neither 
knowable nor is it in issue. 
49 
The essence of Ahdar' s criticism is that assessing how a non-dominant firm would behave 
in a competitive market is not relevant to assessing the conduct of a dominant firm in a 
non-contestable market. Establishing the necessary causal connection in this way is 
significantly less flexible and conceptually sound than the approach adopted in Queensland 
Wire . 
C Subsequent Judicial Interpretations of Clear Communications 
The decision in Port Nelson demonstrates the restrictive effect of the Privy Council ' s test 
for the "use" element. The High Court considered whether each of the five percent 
discount, the $100 minimum charge and the tug tie breached section 36. McGechan J held 
that only the tug tie breached section 36. The Court of Appeal agreed with this finding 
although did express doubt about the usefulness of the Privy Council ' s test : 
152 
While it is not easy to see why the use of a dominant position should not be 
determined simply as a question of fact without the need to postulate artificial 
scenarios, we are content in this case to adopt that approach, as did the High 
Court. 
The Court of Appeal therefore considered whether PNL would have imposed the tug tie, 
assuming that competitive tug services were available to vessels in the port . Gault J 
concluded that a refusal to supply tugs in these circumstances would be "pointless". PNL 
could only refuse to supply tugs where there was no competing tug service available. 
Accordingly, PNL used its dominance in the tug market to affect the pilotage market. 
Gault J further held that a substantial purpose for PNL refusing to supply tugs was to deter 
152 Above n 2, 577. The similarity of this criticism to that of Ahdar' s should be noted. 
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or eliminate the compet1t1ve activity of TBMPL.
153 The "commercial justifications" 
offered by PNL to explain its conduct were rejected. 
154 The tug tie therefore contravened 
section 36. 
The Court of Appeal did not however consider it necessary to decide whether McGechan J 
was correct in finding that the five percent discount and the $100 minimum charge did not 
breach section 36.155 McGechan J found that PNL' s purpose in implementing each of 
these measures was anticompetitive. However, because a non-dominant firm would have 
acted likewise, PNL did not use its dominant position in the wharves, tug and pilotage 
markets . These findings clearly demonstrate the significance of adopting the Privy 
Council ' s restrictive test for the "use" element.
156 The effectiveness of section 36 is 
greatly reduced. It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal chose not to consider whether 
such a restrictive approach was appropriate when section 36 was being used to challenge 
below cost pricing and giving discounts for bundled services. 
Are the courts likely to continue to apply the test in Clear Communications? There are 
indications that the courts will "read down" the Privy Council ' s interpretation of "use". 
The difficulties caused by abstractly applying the Privy Council ' s test for "use" were 
recognised by McGechan J in Port Nelson: 
157 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
Reflecting the difficulty which frequently occurs in the separate analysis of s 36 
"use" and "purpose" (compare Electricity Corp Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd. .. ) 
one must look at the commercial circumstances and steps taken at the time as 
pointing both to the course which a non-dominant firm would have taken in 
relation to a tie and onward to actual purpose. 
Gault J said that the "true purpose in denying tugs to ships piloted by TBMP was the fear that 
TBMP would secure all the pilotage work at the port and so be in a position to hold PNL to 
ransom." See above n 2, 578. 
Above n 2, 577-578. 
The Court of Appeal did not expressly uphold MeGechan J's finding, deciding that it was 
unnecessary to decide these issues in light of the "conclusions already reached." Despite 
recognising the strength of the arguments against McGechan J's findings, the Court of Appeal 
had "not been persuaded that the findings of the High Court should be disturbed". 
If the "use" element had been seen as a causal connector, as it was in Geotherm, it is likely that 
the five percent discount and minimum charge would have contravened section 36. 
Above n 39, 557. 
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Fogarty has also recognised these difficulties. He argues that both Courts in Port Nelson 
reverted to the test for "use" developed in Queensland Wire : 
158 
ln the High Court, use and purpose considerations were deliberately conflated in 
the Geotherm tradition. Post the Privy Council in Telecom v Clear, the elements 
were kept separate in the surface logic of the Court of Appeal. But the underlying 
attraction of considering both elements at the same time was probably present and 
influential. 
IfFogarty's analysis is correct, and subsequent courts approach the elements of section 36 
in this way, the restrictive effect Privy Council's test will be minimised. There is already 
judicial support for this approach. Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corporation of 
New Zealand Ltd ("Interconnection "/ 
59 concerned a dispute over the terms of the 
Interconnection Agreement entered into by Telecom and Clear in 1996. Clear alleged that 
Telecom breached section 36 of the Act by deactivating telephone calls made by Clear 
customers that did not use the 050 access code. Smellie J rejected Telecom' s application 
to stay the proceeding on the basis that the issues surrounding section 36' s application 
were "both difficult and complex" .
160 
Smellie J also briefly considered the substantive arguments and stated a "tentative view" 
that Telecom had used its market dominance and that Clear's argument should prevail. 
These comments are significant because of the way Smellie J applied the "use" test. After 
quoting the test from Clear Communications, Smellie J said : 
16 1 
158 
159 
160 
161 
In deciding how such a person in that position would have acted one is required, so 
it seems to me, to apply the commercial reality test which their Lordships 
impliedly endorsed and which the High Court of Australia laid down in 
J Fogarty "Port Nelson Follows Queensland Wire and Geotherm : Interprets AMPS-A and avoids 
Telecom v Clear" presented at the Eight Annual Workshop of the Competition Law and Policy 
Institute of New Zealand Inc (Auckland, 1996), 2. 
unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, 4 April 1997, CL 54/96. 
Above n 159, 11. 
Above n 159, 12-13. 
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Queensland Wire. If that is so, then it would seem that Telecom would not have 
deactivated whenever possible in an openly competitive market because there 
would have been no advantage in doing so, indeed, a loss of revenue would have 
resulted. Whereas, in reality, deactivation as it is currently aJleged to be 
happening, inevitably results in Telecom picking up the business of the consumer 
affected. 
This dicta demonstrates the way in which Smellie J read down the Privy Council's test in 
Clear Communications in favour of the High Court ' s approach in Queensland Wire . 
Smellie J' s approach therefore requires an assessment of how the dominant firm would act 
· · · k 162 m a compet1t1ve mar et. This assessment, as Queensland Wire and Geotherm 
demonstrate, does not require the court to consider the use and purpose aspects of section 
36 in isolation. 
Similarly, the High Court in Clear Communications Ltd v Sky Network Television Lld
163 
recently acknowledged that "bundling" similar to that undertaken in Port Nelson can still 
be challenged using section 36 of the Act. The Court stated: 
164 
Of course any firm would wish to secure, as available, enhanced economies of 
scope and scale. It might wish to offer packages of services - "bundling" - as 
might any multi-product firm. It might, in the future, undertake bundling activity, 
or cross-subsidisation, of a kind not open to a competitive firm .... 
This comment indicates that future courts will consider the argument that bundling of 
goods and services by a firm may contravene section 36. 
162 
163 
164 
This is essentially the argument that was advanced by Clear. Clear argued that whether a firm 
used its dominant position required an assessment of whether the conduct would be engaged in by 
a rational and profit-seeking firm in a "completely open and competitive market". As noted 
above, this argument was supported by reference to Clear Communications where the Privy 
Council (at page 403) observed that it was necessary to consider how the hypothetical seller 
would act in a competitive market. 
unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry. I August 1997, CP 19/96 
Above n 163, 63. 
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Not all recent New Zealand decisions have sought to limit or distinguish the approach of 
the Privy Council in Clear Communications. The Privy Council's test was strictly applied 
by Penlington J in Purebred Jersey Breed Society (NZ) Inc v Jersey Breeders Association 
Inc. 165 The allegation under section 36 turned on market definition.
166 However, 
Penlington J did consider how to interpret the "use" element of section 36. After noting 
the various criticisms of the Privy Council ' s test, 
167 Penlington J took the view that he was 
bound to apply this test. His Honour did not attempt to read down this test as had 
arguably been done in Port Nelson and the Interconnection case. 
The appropriate approach to determining whether a firm has used its dominant position for 
a proscribed purpose is unclear. The Privy Council's test has attracted both judicial and 
academic criticism. The decisions of the New Zealand courts analysed above clearly 
demonstrate how the decision in Clear Communications limits the effectiveness of section 
3 6 as a sanction against unilateral predatory conduct. 
VI THE EFFECT OF RECENT DECISIONS ON THE SCHEME OF THE ACT 
A The Relationship Between Section 27 and Section 36 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that recent decisions of the courts have fundamentally 
changed the scheme of the Act. The usefulness of section 36 for challenging predatory 
conduct has been significantly reduced by the decision in Clear Communications. 
Predatory conduct that would be condemned under the broadly equivalent provisions in 
overseas jurisdictions is now not condemned under section 3 6 of the Act. 
168 Furthermore, 
much of the predatory conduct that was previously thought to be prohibited by section 36 
may now not be prohibited. This result has been caused by difficulties in satisfying the 
165 
166 
167 
168 
unreported, High Court, Hamilton Registry, 2 May 1997, CP 17/96. 
See above n 165, 126. 
Above n 165, 136. 
A clear example is "predatory pricing". 
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high threshold necessary to establish that a firm has used its market dominance. The scope 
of section 36, as it relates to predatory conduct, has accordingly been reduced. 
The tendency of courts to limit the scope of section 36 can be contrasted with the 
expansive interpretation recently given to section 27. Port Nelson clearly demonstrates 
that section 27 can be used to challenge predatory conduct undertaken by one firm. 
Collusion or concerted action is not required for a firm to contravene section 27.
169 It can 
therefore potentially apply to the unilateral action of one firm. Conduct such as below cost 
pricing and offering discounts for taking a full line of services, traditionally challenged 
under section 36, has been held to contravene section 27 of the Act. 
Using section 27 to challenge predatory conduct may become increasingly attractive to 
New Zealand courts if such unilateral conduct cannot be successfully challenged under 
section 36. Eagles has recognised this possibility in a recent article: 
170 
Litigants are now provided with a potential means of avoiding the higher threshold 
under the dominance provision in any case where it is alleged that the incumbent 
has stolen prospective customers from an entrant by offering them enticing 
contractual terms in the pursuit of impure anti-competitive objectives. (It might 
also be added that the restrictive interpretation of use adopted by the Privy Council 
in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd is likely to 
propel many litigants down this particular road.) 
Such an approach, however, is not without difficulty. The scheme of the Act should be 
considered when determining whether to apply section 27, section 36, or both to the 
particular conduct at issue. Conceptually, the unilateral conduct of a dominant firm should 
be challenged using section 36. The equivalent of section 36 in overseas jurisdictions is 
169 
170 
See I Eagles, above n 35. This point was expressly stated in Clear Communications Ltd v Sky 
Network Television Ltd, above n 163, 68. 
I Eagles, above n 35, 466. 
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used to challenge this kind of conduct.
171 Why, then, are New Zealand courts usmg 
section 27, a section that was not originally intended to apply to unilateral conduct? 
The answer to this question seems to be that section 27 is being used to "compensate" for 
the difficulty, perceived or otherwise, in using section 36 to challenge predatory conduct. 
New Zealand courts seem prepared to extend the scope of section 27 further than it has 
previously applied, either in New Zealand or in overseas jurisdictions. The effect of this 
approach is that the conceptual underpinning of each section is being blurred. Section 27, 
a section designed to prevent anticompetitive contracts, arrangements and understandings, 
is being successfully used to challenge unilateral predatory conduct. While this approach is 
probably preferable to allowing blatant anticompetitive conduct to escape condemnation 
under the Act, courts must be alert to the difficulties that adopting an approach lacking a 
conceptual underpinning may cause. That the courts should have regard to the statutory 
scheme when interpreting and applying the Act was emphasised by McGechan J in Union 
Shipping v Port Nelson Ltd: 172 
[The Commerce Act] is legislation of a type where the Court should not hesitate to 
adopt necessary purposive approaches, in line with North/and Milk Vendors 
Association Inc v North/and Milk Ltd 119881 I NZLR 530 paying due respect to 
legislative policy. 
While promoting competition is the overriding objective of the Act, and by definition, the 
objective of section 27 and section 36, a conceptually clear statutory framework should be 
maintained when achieving this objective. How far would the courts be prepared to extend 
section 27's application to provide a remedy to the victim of unilateral anticompetitive 
conduct who could not establish that the conduct breached section 36? The difficulty in 
further extending section 27' s application is determining where it is appropriate to stop. 
There is a risk that section 36 will serve no useful function if the courts continue to 
171 
172 
The narrow interpretation of section 36 can be contrasted with the expansive interpretation being 
given to Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. A useful discussion of the enabling interpretation 
given to Article 86, in the context of predatory pricing. is N Levy "Tetra Pak II : Stretching the 
Limits of Article 86?" f l 9951 2 ECLR 104. 
Above n 36, 700. 
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interpret section 27 widely in order to prohibit conduct that should be prohibited under 
section 36. Such an approach is conceptually unsound and should not continue. 
Legislative amendment is the most appropriate solution. 
B Legislative Reform of the Act. 
The Act should be amended so that both section 27 and section 36 are used to target the 
conduct that they are intended to challenge. Parliament's intention when enacting the Act 
was to have a system of statutory regulation similar to the Australian Trade Practices Act 
1974.173 The competition law of New Zealand and Australia has diverged, principally 
because of the different ways the courts of each country have interpreted the relevant 
legislation. Notwithstanding these differences, the Australian competition law statute 
continues to provide a sound conceptual basis on which to base New Zealand ' s 
competition law and for this reason wholesale reform of the Act would be inappropriate.
174 
A clear distinction should be maintained between section 27 and section 36. Section 27 
should be targeted at collusive arrangements between firms which have the purpose, effect, 
or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. Section 36 should prohibit dominant 
firms from using their dominance unilaterally for the purpose of restricting entry into, 
deterring competitive conduct in, or eliminating a person from a market.
175 This, broadly 
speaking, is the statutory scheme that was enacted in Australia in 197 4 and continues to 
operate there today.
176 
The distortion to how the Act operates has been caused by the restrictive test for the 
"use" element of section 36 advocated in Clear Communications. The courts ' 
interpretations of the other elements of section 36 have not significantly changed the 
173 
174 
175 
176 
(1985) 468 NZPD 8598. 
Avoiding wholesale reform of the Act also has the desirable effect of preserving the applicability 
of much of the existing New Zealand and overseas case law that defines the scope of the Act. 
The appropriate scope of both section 27 and section 36 is considered by Patterson, above n 4. 
It is acknowledged that there are diLTerences in the wording of the New Zealand and Australian 
Acts, but the policy considerations underlying section 27 and section 36 are almost identical to 
their Australian equivalents. 
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conceptual basis underlying section 36. This cannot be said of the decision in Clear 
Communications. As van Roy has noted, much predatory conduct previously prohibited 
by section 36 will no longer be prohibited under the Privy Council ' s test.
177 Any proposed 
legislative reform should have regard to the conceptual underpinnings of section 36. 
The crucial aspects of section 36 should be proving that a firm is dominant in a market and 
that it acts with an anticompetitive purpose. The "use" element is also necessary and 
ought not be removed. It should, however, operate in the way anticipated in Queensland 
Wire - to connect the two crucial aspects of section 36 identified above. An amendment of 
this nature would remove the inflexibility caused by Clear Communications. A subsection 
could be added to section 36 stating, in a non-exhaustive way, the circumstances where a 
firm uses its dominant position in a market. Such an approach is really no more than 
expressly stating the law as it exists in Australia and would not therefore be seen as a 
radical reform changing the nature of the obligations imposed upon firms under the Act. 
The courts would have the flexibility to condemn unilateral anticompetitive conduct 
undertaken by dominant firms under section 36. Such condemnation would therefore be 
premised on a sound conceptual basis. 
Should a corresponding amendment be made to section 27? The only finding in Port 
Nelson that cannot be easily justified by the policy underlying section 27 is that a plaintiff 
need only show that only the party responsible for including the relevant provision in the 
contract has an anticompetitive purpose. The view taken in this paper is that the Court of 
Appeal ' s approach unnecessarily widens the scope of section 2 7. 
Whether section 27 should be amended is debateable. Predatory conduct is only likely to 
be successfully challenged using section 27 where the severity of the conduct is similar to 
that in Port Nelson. Most litigants would have a greater chance of successfully challenging 
such conduct by using the amended section 36. This may effectively remove the need to 
rely on the Court of Appeal ' s interpretation of the purpose limb of section 2 7. 
177 Above n 1, 58. 
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The difficulty perpetuated by not amending section 27 is that the courts may continue to 
use it to challenge unilateral conduct. Accordingly, section 27 should be amended to apply 
only to contracts where two or more parties to the contract seek to achieve the same 
anticompetitive objective. 
178 Section 27 could not be breached unless the parties to the 
contract collude to achieve an anticompetitive purpose or effect. Unilateral conduct would 
therefore be excluded from the ambit of section 2 7. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The decision in Port Nelson is significant because it demonstrates the courts willingness to 
ensure the promotion of competition in New Zealand markets. The five percent discount 
and the below cost pricing were successfully challenged under section 27. PNL' s refusal 
to supply tugs was successfully challenged under section 36. How each section was 
interpreted and applied in Port Nelson is significant not only for the outcome of the case, 
but also for the likely outcome of future cases where similar conduct is being considered. 
The Court of Appeal significantly widened the scope of section 27 by affirming McGechan 
J' s finding that the section applies where only one party to a contract has an 
anticompetitive purpose. Section 27 can now be used to challenge unilateral conduct. 
This finding is difficult to justify when one considers that the policy underlying section 27 
requires the contracting parties to collude to achieve an anticompetitive result before the 
section applies. Whether future courts will apply section 27 in this way remains to be 
determined. 
Port Nelson was the Court of Appeal's first opportunity to consider the Privy Council ' s 
judgment in Clear Communications. While the Court did express dissatisfaction with their 
Lordships' interpretation of the "use" element of section 36, it did not attempt to limit the 
178 The amendment should also apply to arrangements and understandings even though the 
reasoning in Port Nelson did not strictly speaking apply to them. The amendment should be 
made by adding a further subsection to section 27 which broadly states the principle that section 
27 will only apply where the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding collude to 
achieve an anticompetitive purpose or effect. 
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application of Clear Communications in future cases. The result is that section 36's 
effectiveness in challenging predatory conduct is greatly reduced. Although there are 
indications that future courts may have regard to the reasoning in cases like Queensland 
Wire and Geotherm, this result is far from ideal. 
Port Nelson is also significant for other reasons. Both section 27 and section 36 were 
closely analysed. The scope of section 27 has been usefully clarified. The Court of Appeal 
emphasised the importance of the distinction between lessening competition and lessening 
the effectiveness of an individual competitor. Furthermore, the Court clarified the 
relationship between the purpose, effect and likely effect limbs of section 27. This analysis 
will no doubt assist future courts when applying the Act. 
The argument made in this paper is that the approach of both Courts in Port Nelson fails to 
have sufficient regard to the scheme underlying the Act. Section 27 should target collusive 
anticompetitive conduct. Section 36 should target the anticompetitive conduct of 
dominant firms . The decision in Port Nelson has fundamentally changed the scheme of the 
Act. The solution proposed in this paper is a limited legislative amendment to both 
sections. These proposed reforms should not be seen as groundbreaking or radical. They 
are simply intended to ensure that the Act functions as originally intended by Parliament. 
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